|
|
Material |
Mental |
|
Subjective
(Self) |
Claims
about the existence of my human body, where it has existed (at or near the
surface of the earth), and when it has existed (born at a certain time in the
past and has existed continuously ever since). |
Claims
about the existence and kind of experiences I have had—perceptions of
material objects and facts about them, expectations of the future, true and
false beliefs, thoughts about imaginary objects, illusory experiences. |
|
Objective
(Others) |
Claims
about the existence of other objects (including other human bodies), where
they have existed (at some distance from or in contact with my body), and
when. |
Claims
about other minds and the experiences they have had—other creatures with
human bodies have had the same kinds of experiences I have had. |
I.
Moore’s
Theses
A.
Two
main claims
1.
Common
Sense Propositions (CSPs) are true.
2.
Many
people have known that CSPs are true.
B.
Clarifications
1.
CSPs
are not partially true, they are wholly true.
2.
CSPs
are true under their ordinary everyday meaning.
C.
Opponents
1.
Some
or all of CSPs are not true.
a.
Some:
Since matter or space is not real, all the material claims are false.
b.
All: Since time or selves are not real, all CSPs
(including all the mental claims) are false.
2.
Subjective
mental claims are known to be true, but even if some of the other claims are
true they are not known to be so.
D.
Common
Sense Realism
1.
CSPs
are true.
2.
We
know that CSPs are true.
3.
Matter,
space, time, and selves are real.
4.
Metaphysics:
Analyze the ordinary meanings of CSPs to find out what objects/properties must
exist.
5.
Epistemology:
Analyze what we ordinarily mean when we say that we know CSPs to find out what
knowledge is.
II.
Moore’s
Defense of His Two Main Theses
A.
CSPs
are true
1.
Those
who claim that matter/space/time/selves are not real hold inconsistent beliefs.
2.
The
fact that philosophers have produced arguments that matter/space/time/selves
provides no reason whatsoever to hold those views.
a.
If
there have been philosophers who have argued for such claims, then those claims
are false.
b.
The
arguments that the reality of matter/space/time/selves leads to contradictions
can be undermined:
P1: If the
reality of matter/space/time/selves led to contradiction, then some or all CSPs
would lead to contradiction.
P2: CSPs are
true.
P3: No true
statements lead to contradiction.
C1: So no
CSPs lead to contradiction.
C2: So the
reality of matter/space/time/selves does not lead to contradiction.
B.
CSPs
are known to be true
1.
The
claim, “Many people have believed CSPs but they do not count as knowledge” is self-contradictory
according to Moore.
a.
This
claim is not logically self-contradictory.
But asserting the skeptical proposition is self-defeating. Asserting, and thereby claiming to know, the
first conjunct of the skeptical proposition is undermined by asserting the
second conjunct.
b.
But
what about skeptical arguments put in the first person and the claim “I do not
know any material or objective CSPs”?
2.
Moore
appears to claim to know CSPs simply on the basis that they appear certain to
him and that he has no good reason to think that they are not true.
III.
Certainty
A.
Descartes
1.
Knowledge
requires certainty.
2.
Certainty
requires being able to rule out any possibility of being false.
3.
This
requires that a belief be infallible.
4.
S’s
belief that P is infallible =df Not possible that S believes P and yet P
is not true.
B.
Moore
1.
Knowledge
requires certainty
2.
Certainty
does not require being able to rule out any possibility that P is false.
3.
Certainty
requires: Incorrigibility, Indubitability, Psychological Self-Evidence??
a.
S’s
belief that P is incorrigible =df Not possible that someone can show S
that P is false.
b.
S’s
belief that P is indubitable =df Not possible for there to be rational
grounds for S to doubt that P is true.
c.
S’s
belief that P is psychologically self-evident =df P seems certain to S.
IV.
Moore
on the Problem of Skepticism
A.
Skeptical
Arguments: The Moore Shift
1.
If
the standard skeptical argument is P therefore C, where C denies that we know
some CSP, then Moore will turn the argument on its head and make Not-C
therefore Not-P.
2.
In
other words, Moore will always give more credence to CSPs (and thus not-C) than
to the premises of some skeptical argument (P). Any argument that purports to show that we do not know some CSP
must have something wrong with it.
3.
The
Dream Argument:
a.
Moore
agrees that if I really know there is a hand in front of my face, then I know I
am not dreaming.
b.
Moore
would argue however that he does know that he is not dreaming—because he knows
that there is a hand in front of his face.
B.
Skeptical
Aporia:
1.
Moore
definitely accepts that knowledge requires certainty.
2.
Moore
seems to accept the possibility that appearances can be massively in error.
3.
Moore
definitely accepts that we know a lot about reality.
4.
Moore
definitely says that we do not directly perceive objects themselves and that
what we do directly perceive is a ‘sense-datum’, but he leaves open whether
that sense-datum is identical with the surface of an object and the exact
nature of the relationship between the sense-datum and the object it
represents.