PHIL 309: Twentieth Century Analytic Philosophy

LARKIN: Spring 2003

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Russell, “On Denoting”

 

I.                     The Theory of Descriptions

A.      Denoting Phrases

1.        Indefinite Descriptions

a.        Universal quantifier phrases

“All F’s”

b.       Existential quantifier phrases

“Some F”

“An F”

2.        Definite Descriptions

“The F”

 

B.       Main Thesis

1.        Denoting Phrases (DPs) do not have meaning in isolation.

2.        DPs do not stand for genuine constituents of propositions.

3.        DPs are not like (genuine/logically proper) names.

4.        The meaning of a DP is not its denotation.

5.        DP sentences are not about the objects, if any, denoted by the DP.

6.        DP sentences are actually about properties.

 

C.       Russellian Analyses

1.        Indefinite Descriptions

a.        universal quantifier phrase sentences

“All F are G” => “For all x, if x is F then x is G” =>

“If something instantiates F, then it instantiates G as well”

 

b.       existential quantifier phrase sentences

“Some F is G” => “There is an x such that x is both F and G” =>

“There is at least one thing that co-instantiates F and G.”

 

2.        Definite Descriptions

“The F is G” => “There is an x such that x is F, and if anything else y is F then y=x, and x is G” =>

“There is one and only one F and that thing is G” =>

“There is something that co-instantiates being-a-unique-F and G”

 

D.      The Hard Case = Definite Descriptions

Whereas it is somewhat easy to see that universal and existential generalizations are not really claims about objects, it is much more counter-intuitive in the case of definite description sentences.  The sentence “The president of the US is hawkish” certainly seems to be a claim about George W. Bush.  But on Russell’s analysis, it is not.  It is rather a claim about the properties being a unique president of the US and being hawkish.  Thus Russell spends OD mainly arguing for his analysis of definite description sentences.

 

 

II.                   Main Argument

 

P1:          The theory of descriptions (TOD) avoids the difficulties of regarding denoting phrases as standing for genuine constituents of propositions.

 

1a:           Avoids difficulties with apparently empty denoting phrases.

1b:           Avoids difficulties with the relationship between meanings and denotations.

 

P2:          TOD can give solutions to the three semantic puzzles.

               

                                2a:           The Law of Identity Problem

                                2b:           The Law of Excluded Middle Problem

2c:           The Problem with True Negative Existentials

 

P3:          TOD helps resolve some important philosophical issues.

 

                                3a:           Empty and Fictional Names

                                3b:           Frege’s Puzzle

3c:           Talking and thinking about things with which we are not acquainted.

 

C:            TOD is good.

 

III.                 Frege and Meinong

A.      At Issue

1.        Russell holds that DPs do not correspond to genuine constituents of propositions—DP sentences are not about the denotation of a DP.

2.        Frege and Meinong think that DPs do correspond to genuine constituents of propositions—they must say that DP sentences are at least in aprt about the denotation of the DP.

3.        The Problem: Denoting Phrases that are apparently empty

a.        Meinong must say that these DPs correspond to an existent object that does not subsist.

b.       Frege must say that these denoting phrases do have a sense but no referent, but he stills needs to have sentences involving these DPs be about something other than the sense—so Frege must find a referent even for those sense that appear to not have any referent.

4.        Russell doesn’t have to worry about trying to find some referent of a denoting phrase that appears to be empty, for he analyzes those phrases away and is not committed to DP sentences being about the denotation of the DP.

 

B.       Meinong’s Problem

P1:  If Meinong is right, then the phrase ‘the round square’ denotes an object that exists but does not subsist. 

 

P2:  But if ‘the round square’ denotes an object that in some sense exists, then there is in some sense a thing that is both round and not round at the same time.

 

P3:  This violates the law of non-contradiction.

 

C:    So Meinong is wrong.

 

C.       Frege’s Problem

P0:  Assume that a denoting phrase expresses a meaning and denotes a denotation/referent.

 

P1:  “The present king of England is bald” is not about the meaning of the phrase ‘the present king of England’ but rather its denotation.

 

C1:  So, by parity of form, “The present King of France is bald” is not about the meaning but the denotation of ‘the present king of France’.

 

P2:  If “The present king of France is bald” is about the denotation of ‘the present king of France’, then the sentence is nonsense (it is not about anything).

 

P3:  But the sentence is not nonsense (it is false [or perhaps it is neither true nor false]).

 

C2:                  So “The present king of France is bald” is not about the denotation of ‘the present king of France’.

 

C3:                  Since C1 and C2 are contradictory, the assumption (P0) must be false.

 

D.      Generalized Argument

P1:  If denoting phrase sentences have a subject-predicate structure, then they are (all) meaningful only if the denoting phrase denotes something.

 

P2:  There are (some) meaningful denoting phrase sentences with empty denoting phrases.

 

C:    So denoting phrase sentences do not have a subject-predicate structure.    

 

 

Meinong objects to P2 by claiming that apparently empty denoting phrases denote objects that exist but do not subsist.

Russell complains that this way around the problem violates the law of non-contradiction.

 

Frege objects to P3 by claiming that apparently empty denoting phrases express senses that denote the null class.

Russell complains that this way around the problem is ad hoc.

 

 

IV.                 Gray’s Elegy Argument

The basic need for the Gray’s Elegy argument arises as follows:  If DPs are to stand for genuine constituents of propositions, then (a) they must stand for something like a meaning (Fregean sense, denoting complex) and not just their referent [or else we would be stuck with a Meinong-style view to account for apparently empty DPs], but (b) DP sentences still need to be about the referent or denotation of the DP.  The Gray’s Elegy argument is intended to show that these desiderata cannot be jointly satisfied. 

 

Gray’s Elegy Argument (version 1)

P0:           Assume: Denoting phrases express denoting complexes that denote denotations.

 

P1:           The relationship between a denoting complex and the denotation must be a ‘logical one’.

 

C1:          So propositions expressed using denoting phrases are solely about the denotation (they are not about the denoting complex).

 

P2:           “Scott is the author of Waverly” is not solely about the denotation of the denoting phrase ‘the author of Waverly’ but also about the meaning of that phrase (i.e., the denoting complex).

 

C2:          So propositions expressed using denoting phrases are not solely about the denotation (they are also about the denoting complex).

 

C3:          Since C1 and C2 are contradictory the assumption must be false.

 

 

 

Gray’s Elegy Argument (version 2)

P1:           If denoting phrase (DP) sentences have a subject-predicate structure, then a DP must either contribute an object (its denotation) or a denoting complex (its meaning) to the proposition expressed by the sentence in which DP occurs.

 

P2:           If DP contributes an object, then the proposition expressed is solely about the denotation and not the denoting complex.

 

P3:           If DP contributes a denoting complex, then still the proposition expressed is solely about the denotation and not the denoting complex. 

[Due to the logical relation that must exist between a denoting complex and the denotation.]

 

P4:           Propositions expressed by DP sentences are not solely about the denotation but also in part about the denoting complex. 

[Scott/author of Waverly puzzle]

 

C:            So DP sentences do not have a subject-predicate structure.

 

 

V.                   Semantic Puzzles

Russell argues that his theory of descriptions can resolve three puzzles concerning DP sentences.  He construes the puzzles as data that a semantic theory needs to account for.  They can also be seen as a test for whether a semantic theory is consistent with the laws of logic: the law of identity, the law of excluded middle, and the law of non-contradiction.

 

See ‘Semantic Puzzles’ Handout

 

VI.                 Philosophical Implications

A.      Empty and Fictional Names: Difficulties here can be resolved by viewing these names as described definite descriptions.

B.       Frege’s Puzzle:  See ‘Semantic Puzzle’ handout

C.       Knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by desciption:  Russell contends that we cannot speak or think about objects with which we have had no acquaintance.  Yet we appear to do so.  Russell’s theory of description allows us to see that propositions that might appear to be about objects with which we are not or cannot be acquainted are really propositions about things with which we are acquainted—namely properties (and perhaps some simple objects to which we can demonstratively refer).

 

VII.