PHIL 309: Twentieth Century Analytic Philosophy

LARKIN: Spring 2003

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Moore’s Refutation of Idealism

 

A.      The role of “esse is percipi” in Idealist arguments

1.        Moore contends that this claim is essential to any Idealist argument

2.        By disputing the Idealist support for this claim, he will have thus refuted an argument for the Idealist thesis that reality is spiritual.

3.        Moore is not arguing that the Idealist thesis that reality is spiritual is false.

4.        He is arguing only that arguments for it based on the claim that to be is to be perceived are flawed.

5.        For he contends that arguing for the claim in the way Idealists must leads to contradiction.

6.        So Moore does not refute the Idealist thesis but the Idealist argument for that thesis.  And he does so by showing not that the claim ‘esse is percipi’ is false, but by showing that the Idealist way of arguing for that claim leads to contradiction.

 

B.       “Percipi”: This is interpreted in the most general sense to include not only sensations but thoughts.

1.        sensations: mental events with non-conceptualized, qualitative content (e.g., pains, sensations of red)

2.        thoughts: mental events with conceptualized, propositional content (e.g., my belief that the Orioles won the ’83 World Series)

 

C.       Some useful distinctions

1.        Metaphysical

a.        A claim S is necessary iff S is true in all (of a certain range of) possible worlds.

b.       A claim S is contingent iff S is true in some (of a certain range of) possible world but false in some other possible world (in that range).

2.        Kinds of Necessity

a.        Logical: True in all logically possible worlds—i.e., worlds that abide the laws of logic.  (e.g., P º ~~P)

b.       Metaphysical: True in all metaphysically possible worlds—i.e., worlds that abide the laws of metaphysics.  (e.g., water = H2O)

c.        Physical (Nomological): True in all physically possible worlds—i.e., worlds that abide the laws of nature.  (e.g., E = mc­2 )

3.        Epistemological

a.        A Priori: Capable of being known independently of sense-experience (or at least no more sense experience than is required to attain the relevant concepts)

b.       A Posteriori: Not capable of being known independently of sense-experience.

4.        Semantic

a.        Analytic: True solely in virtue of the meanings of the words/concepts involved.

b.       Synthetic: Not true solely in virtue of the meanings of the words/concepts involved.

 

 

D.      Three senses of “esse is percipi”

1.        Synonymy:

a.        The words ‘esse’ and ‘percipi’ have precisely the same meaning.

b.       Analogous to “Bachelors are unmarried adult human males”.

c.        Under this interpretation the claim is certainly false.

2.        Analytic Containment:

a.        The meaning of ‘percipi’ is part but not all of the meaning of ‘esse’.

b.       Analogous to “Bachelors are male”.

c.        Under this interpretation, the claim is as trivial as claiming that B follows from (A and B).

3.        Synthetic Necessity:

a.        The only way for ‘esse is percipi’ to be both true and significant is if it is a synthetic necessity.

b.       Synthetic: A claim about the world/the nature of reality, not merely about the way we use words or concepts.

c.        Necessity: A claim whose negation is in a sense ‘inconceivable’.  (I take it that we are talking about a metaphysical necessity here.  In which case the claim would be saying that in a ll metaphysically possible worlds, wherever you have the property of being you have the property of being perceived.)

 

 

E.       Moore’s Overall Argument Against Idealism

 

P1:  Idealism is committed to the central claim that “Esse is percipi”.

               

 

P2:  The Idealists are committed to their central claim being a synthetic necessity.

                2a:  “Esse is percipi” can be interpreted in one of three ways:

(i)                   Analytic Identity: ‘esse’ =df ‘percipi’

(ii)                 Analytic Necessity: NEC(‘esse’ Édf ‘percipi’)

(iii)                Synthetic Necessity: NEC(esse É percipi) [ & ~(esse =percipi)]

2b:  The analytic identity statement is false.

2c:  The analytic necessity claim is unimportant.

2d:  The Idealists intend their central claim to be a claim about the world, not merely a claim about the meanings of words or the relationships between concepts.

2e:  So the central claim must be interpreted as a synthetic necessity.

 

[Moorean Assumption #1:  2a fails to consider the possibility of a Synthetic Identity: esse = percipi, analogous to water = H2O.]

 

P3:  Idealists are committed to saying that ‘esse is percipi’ can be proved by the law of non-contradiction alone.

3a:  The central claim is not a posteriori.  (AS rationalists, the absolute idealists are committed to their central claim about the fundamental nature of reality to be knowable not through the senses but through Reason.)

 

3b:  So the central claim must be knowable a priori either as a self-evident truth or as one that can be proved by the law of non-contradiction alone.

 

3c:  As a matter of fact the Idealists do not claim that it is self-evident.  But at any rate it does not appear to be self-evident—and self-evidence, by definition, ought to be a transparent feature (i.e., if some proposition has that feature, then it is obvious that it does).

 

3d:  So the central claim must be provable by the law of non-contradiction alone—which I take to mean provable by Reductio Ad Absurdum without importing any premise that is not a tautology (truth of logic).

 

[Moorean Assumption #2:  That there is no alternative for the rationalist to self-evident or logically demonstrable.   Assumes that Reason is not, in part, a non-demonstrative but penetrating faculty—one that can provide direct access to truths that are not self-evident.]

 

P4:  Proving the central claim of idealism by the law of non-contradiction alone requires the assumption that, e.g., yellow (Y) = sensation of yellow (S).

4a:  Such a demonstration of the central claim of idealism requires going from ~NEC(Y É S) to POS(Y & ~Y) [or POS(S & ~S)]. 

 

4b:  But such a move assumes that Y = S.

 

C1:  So Idealism is committed to the claim that ~(Y = S) from P2 and to the claim that (Y = S) from P3 and P4.

 

C2:  So Idealism leads to contradiction. 

 

 

 

 

F.   Simplified Version of Argument Against Idealism?:

 

Idealists =df          Rationalists who argue that reality is spiritual on the basis of the claim that to be is to be perceived.

 

P1:  Idealists are committed to saying that a synthetic necessity can be proved by the law of non-contradiction alone.

 

P2:  The claim that a synthetic necessity can be proved by the law of non-contradiction alone leads to contradiction.

 

C:  So Idealism leads to contradiction.

 

 

 

 

G.       Idealism vs. Realism in a Nutshell

1.        Pro-Idealist Argument

 

P1:  We cannot conceive of anything that is inconceivable by us.

 

P2:  Only conceptions are conceivable.

 

P3:  Conceptions are mind-dependent.

 

C1:  So , we cannot conceive of anything that is mind-independent.

 

C2:  So we can have no grounds for positing the existence of mind-independent entities.

 

 

2.        I believe the crux of the issue between idealists and realists comes down to P2 of the above argument, which I believe is supported by a certain view of thinking/thought.

a.        The Idealist to support P2 will say that thought cannot reach out to the world beyond the mind—thought only provides direct access to thoughts/experiences, i.e., mental events.

b.       The Realist can respond by saying that this is a flawed model of thought—thought can reach out into the world and provide direct access to mind-independent objects.

 

 

3.        It is not clear that there is any non-question-begging way to defend either view of thought against the other.

4.        Both the Realist and the Idealist have trouble with the Skeptic:

a.        The Skeptic claims that (i) it is possible for appearances to diverge from reality—there can be non-veridical experiences, but (ii) veridical and non-veridical experiences are indistinguishable.

b.       The Idealist will have trouble accounting for (i).

c.        The Realist will have trouble accounting for (ii).