Arguments in Russell,  “On Denoting”

 

 

I.  MAIN ARGUMENT

 

P1:       The theory of descriptions (TOD) avoids the difficulties of regarding denoting phrases as standing for genuine constituents of propositions.

 

1a:        Difficulties with apparently empty denoting phrases.

1b:       Difficulties with the relationship between meanings and denotations.

 

P2:       TOD can give solutions to the three semantic puzzles.

           

                        2a:        The Law of Identity Problem

                        2b:       The Law of Excluded Middle Problem

2c:        The Problem with True Negative Existentials

 

P3:       TOD helps resolve some important philosophical issues.

 

                        3a:        Empty and Fictional Names

                        3b:       Frege’s Puzzle

3c:        Talking and thinking about things with which we are not acquainted.

 

C:         TOD is good.

 

 

II.  Problem with Apparently Empty Denoting Phrases

 

A.     Meinong’s Problem

P1:       If Meinong is right, then the phrase ‘the round square’ denotes an object that exists but does not subsist. 

 

P2:       But if ‘the round square’ denotes an object that in some sense exists, then there is in some sense a thing that is both round and not round at the same time.

 

P3:       This violates the law of non-contradiction.

 

C:         So Meinong is wrong.

 

 

 

 

 

 

B.     Frege’s Problem

P0:       Assume that a denoting phrase expresses a meaning and denotes a denotation/referent.

 

P1:       “The present king of England is bald” is not about the meaning of the phrase ‘the present king of England’ but rather its denotation.

 

C1:       So, by parity of form, “The present King of France is bald” is not about the meaning but the denotation of ‘the present king of France’.

 

P2:       If “The present king of France is bald” is about the denotation of ‘the present king of France’, then the sentence is nonsense (it is not about anything).

 

P3:       But the sentence is not nonsense (it is false [or perhaps it is neither true nor false]).

 

C2:       So “The present king of France is bald” is not about the denotation of ‘the present king of France’.

 

C3:       Since C1 and C2 are contradictory, the assumption (P0) must be false.

 

C.     Generalized Argument

P1:       If denoting phrase sentences have a subject-predicate structure, then they are (all) meaningful only if the denoting phrase denotes something.

 

P2:       There are (some) meaningful denoting phrase sentences with empty denoting phrases.

 

C:         So denoting phrase sentences do not have a subject-predicate structure.    

 

Meinong objects to P2 by claiming that apparently empty denoting phrases denote objects that exist but do not subsist.

 

Russell complains that this way around the problem violates the law of non-contradiction.

 

Frege objects to P3 by claiming that apparently empty denoting phrases express senses that denote the null class.

 

Russell complains that this way around the problem is ad hoc.

 

 

 

 

III. Problem with the Relation between Meaning and Denotation

 

Gray’s Elegy Argument (version 1)

P0:       Assume: Denoting phrases express denoting complexes which denote denotations.

 

P1:       The relationship between a denoting complex and the denotation must be a ‘logical one’.

 

C1:       So propositions expressed using denoting phrases are solely about the denotation (they are not about the denoting complex).

 

P2:       “Scott is the author of Waverly” is not solely about the denotation of the denoting phrase ‘the author of Waverly’ but also about the meaning of that phrase (i.e., the denoting complex).

 

C2:       So propositions expressed using denoting phrases are not solely about the denotation (they are also about the denoting complex).

 

C3:       Since C1 and C2 are contradictory the assumption must be false.

 

 

 

Gray’s Elegy Argument (version 2)

 

P1:       If denoting phrase (DP) sentences have a subject-predicate structure, then a DP must either contribute an object (its denotation) or a denoting complex (its meaning) to the proposition expressed by the sentence in which DP occurs.

 

P2:       If DP contributes an object, then the proposition expressed is solely about the denotation and not the denoting complex.

 

P3:       If DP contributes a denoting complex, then still the proposition expressed is solely about the denotation and not the denoting complex. 

[Due to the logical relation that must exist between a denoting complex and the denotation.]

 

P4:       Propositions expressed by DP sentences are not solely about the denotation but also in part about the denoting complex. 

[Scott/author of Waverly puzzle]

 

C:         So DP sentences do not have a subject-predicate structure.