Illinois Philosophical
Association
11/02/02
______________________________________
I. Introduction
A. The Problem
1. A broad perceptual model of introspection claims that we are aware of our own occurrent thoughts in a direct and non-empirical way via a faculty that is broadly analogous to ordinary perception.
2. First-person authority is the thesis that the first-person (privileged) introspective judgments that we make about the contents of our own occurrent thoughts are on a qualitatively better epistemic footing than the third-person (ordinary) perceptual judgments we make about the external world.
3. How can an account of introspection explicitly modeled on ordinary perception account for a significant difference in epistemic status between privileged introspective judgments and ordinary perceptual judgments?
4. Objective: To show how the thesis of first-person authority could possibly be true given a broad perceptual model of introspection.
B. A Philosophical Explanation
1. Explanandum: First-Person Authority
2. Apparent Excluder: A broad perceptual model of introspection
3. Explanatory hypothesis: Pure reliabilist warrant is qualitatively better than qualified reliabilist warrant.
4. Thesis: Privileged introspective judgments (PIJs) can enjoy pure reliabilist warrant whereas ordinary perceptual judgments (OPJs) cannot.
C. The Significance of the Problem
1. A broad perceptual model is at present our best hope of providing a naturalistically appealing account of introspection—a faculty that is crucial to a cluster of distinctively human cognitive capacities.
2. First-person authority is a central tenet of common sense psychology.
3. Thus a philosophical explanation of how first-person authority could possibly be true given a broad perceptual model of introspection appears to be as significant as the attempt to reconcile a naturalistic account of human cognition with common sense psychology.
II. The Problem
A. First-Person Authority
1. Introspection is that faculty by means of which we form first-person judgments that constitute our non-empirical awareness of the contents of our own occurrent thoughts.
2. Introspection provides us privileged access to the contents of our own occurrent thoughts insofar as no one else can be non-empirically aware of our thoughts—for everyone else must rely on observations of our behavior and/or environment to know what the contents of our occurrent thoughts are.
3. First-person authority can be thought of as extending the intuitively undeniable thesis of privileged access in two irresistible ways.
a. Not only is our access to our own occurrent thoughts different from others’ access to them, it is qualitatively better.
b. Not only are first-person introspective judgments ‘better’ than the third-personal judgments that others make about our occurrent thoughts, they are in like fashion better than all third-personal judgments—including our own perceptual judgments about the external world.
B. A Broad Perceptual Model of Introspection (BPM)
1. Higher-Order Belief Theory of Awareness: Our awareness of occurrent thought contents is constituted by higher-order beliefs about them.
2. Contingent Causal Connection: In the absence of any causal malfunction or interference, occurrent thoughts cause higher-order beliefs about their contents.
3. Teleo-Functional Mechanism: The mechanisms responsible for the causal production of introspective judgments have the teleological function of providing information about the presence of certain types of thoughts. (The function of the higher-order belief producing mechanism determines the content of the higher-order belief.)
4. Reliabilism: Introspective judgments are warranted in virtue of the reliability of the mechanism responsible for their causal production by occurrent thoughts.
C. The Conflict
1. First-person authority requires that there be some epistemic defect to which PIJs are immune but OPJs are not.
a. Infallibility: S’s belief that P is infallible =df It is not possible that (S believes P but P is false).
b. Indubitability: S’s belief that P is indubitable =df It is not possible that (S believes P but there are rational grounds for doubting that P).
c. Incorrigibility: S’s belief that P is incorrigible =df It is not possible that (S believes P but one can show that S is mistaken).
2. But given BPM, there does not seem to be any such epistemic defect.
III. The Solution
A. My Explanatory Hypothesis: Pure reliabilist warrant is qualitatively better than qualified reliabilist warrant.
1. Pure Reliabilist Warrant: A belief B can enjoy pure reliabilist warrant iff being produced by a reliable belief-forming mechanism is sufficient to warrant B.
2. Qualified Reliabilist Warrant: A belief B can (only) enjoy qualified reliabilist warrant iff being produced by a reliable belief-forming mechanism is necessary but not sufficient to warrant B because some further condition is required to rule out the possibility that maintaining B is subjectively irrational.
3. Subjective Irrationality: It is subjectively irrational for S to maintain a belief B iff S is aware that there is evidence sufficient to undermine S’s trust in the source of B.
B. OPJs cannot enjoy pure reliabilist warrant: Bon Jour Cases
C. PIJs can enjoy pure reliabilist warrant: They are immune to subjective irrationality.
1. First Argument
P1: It is subjectively irrational for S to maintain some arbitrary PIJ, J, only if S recognizes that the source of J is untrustworthy.
P2: It is not possible for S to recognize that the source of J is untrustworthy.
2a: Recognizing that the source of J is untrustworthy requires that the source of J be both trustworthy and untrustworthy in the same context.
2b: It is not possible for the source of J to be both trustworthy and untrustworthy in the same context.
C: So it is not possible that it is subjectively irrational for S to maintain any PIJ.
2. Second Argument
P1: It is subjectively irrational for S to maintain some arbitrary PIJ, J, at time t1 only if S can cogently argue at t1 from some consciously held beliefs to the conclusion that she should not to trust the source of J.
P2: It is not possible for S to cogently argue at t1 from some consciously held beliefs to the conclusion that she should not trust the source of J.
2a: Any argument at t1 from consciously held beliefs that are relevant to J will involve trusting the source of J—the t1-introspective mechanisms relevant to J.
2b: Any argument that relies on the source of J to show that the source of J should not be trusted is self-defeating.
C: So it is not possible that it is subjectively irrational for S to maintain any PIJ.