CHAPTER XVI - OF THE FOUNDATIONS OF A STATE; OF THE NATURAL AND CIVIL
RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS; AND OF THE RIGHTS OF THE SOVEREIGN POWER.
Hitherto our care has been to separate philosophy from theology, and
to show the freedom of thought which such separation insures to both. It
is now time to determine the limits to which such freedom of thought and
discussion may extend itself in the ideal state. For the due consideration
of this question we must examine the foundations of a State, first turning
our attention to the natural rights of individuals, and afterwards to religion
and the state as a whole.
By the right and ordinance of nature, I merely mean those natural laws
wherewith we conceive every individual to be conditioned by nature, so
as to live and act in a given way. For instance, fishes are naturally conditioned
for swimming, and the greater for devouring the less; therefore fishes
enjoy the water, and the greater devour the less by sovereign natural right.
For it is certain that nature, taken in the abstract, has sovereign right
to do anything, she can; in other words, her right is co-extensive with
her power. The power of nature is the power of God, which has sovereign
right over all things; and, inasmuch as the power of nature is simply the
aggregate of the powers of all her individual components, it follows that
every individual has sovereign right to do all that he can; in other words,
the rights of an individual extend to the utmost limits of his power as
it has been conditioned. Now it is the sovereign law and right of nature
that each individual should endeavour to preserve itself as it is, without
regard to anything but itself; therefore this sovereign law and right belongs
to every individual, namely, to exist and act according to its natural
conditions. We do not here acknowledge any difference between mankind and
other individual natural entities, nor between men endowed with reason
and those to whom reason is unknown; nor between fools, madmen, and sane
men. Whatsoever an individual does by the laws of its nature it has a sovereign
right to do, inasmuch as it acts as it was conditioned by nature, and cannot
act otherwise. Wherefore among men, so long as they are considered as living
under the sway of nature, he who does not yet know reason, or who has not
yet acquired the habit of virtue, acts solely according to the laws of
his desire with as sovereign a right as he who orders his life entirely
by the laws of reason. That is, as the wise man has sovereign right to
do all that reason dictates, or to live according to the laws of reason,
so also the ignorant and foolish man has sovereign right to do all that
desire dictates, or to live according to the laws of desire. This is identical
with the teaching of Paul, who acknowledges that previous to the law -
that is, so long as men are considered of as living under the sway of nature,
there is no sin.
The natural right of the individual man is thus determined, not by
sound reason, but by desire and power. All are not naturally conditioned
so as to act according to the laws and rules of reason; nay, on the contrary,
all men are born ignorant, and before they can learn the right way of life
and acquire the habit of virtue, the greater part of their life, even if
they have been well brought up, has passed away. Nevertheless, they are
in the meanwhile bound to live and preserve themselves as far as they can
by the unaided impulses of desire. Nature has given them no other guide,
and has denied them the present power of living according to sound reason;
so that they are no more bound to live by the dictates of an enlightened
mind, than a cat is bound to live by the laws of the nature of a lion.
Whatsoever, therefore, an individual (considered as under the sway
of nature) thinks useful for himself, whether led by sound reason or impelled
by the passions, that he has a sovereign right to seek and to take for
himself as he best can, whether by force, cunning, entreaty, or any other
means; consequently he may regard as an enemy anyone who hinders the accomplishment
of his purpose.
It follows from what we have said that the right and ordinance of nature,
under which all men are born, and under which they mostly live, only prohibits
such things as no one desires, and no one can attain: it does not forbid
strife, nor hatred, nor anger, nor deceit, nor, indeed, any of the means
suggested by desire.
This we need not wonder at, for nature is not bounded by the laws of
human reason, which aims only at man's true benefit and preservation; her
limits are infinitely wider, and have reference to the eternal order of
nature, wherein man is but a speck; it is by the necessity of this alone
that all individuals are conditioned for living and acting in a particular
way. If anything, therefore, in nature seems to us ridiculous, absurd,
or evil, it is because we only know in part, and are almost entirely
ignorant of the order and interdependence of nature as a whole, and also
because we want everything to be arranged according to the dictates of
our human reason; in reality that which reason considers evil, is not evil
in respect to the order and laws of nature as a whole, but only in respect
to the laws of our reason.
Nevertheless, no one can doubt that it is much better for us to live
according to the laws and assured dictates of reason, for, as we said,
they have men's true good for their object. Moreover, everyone wishes to
live as far as possible securely beyond the reach of fear, and this would
be quite impossible so long as everyone did everything he liked, and reason's
claim was lowered to a par with those of hatred and anger; there is no
one who is not ill at ease in the midst of enmity, hatred, anger, and deceit,
and who does not seek to avoid them as much as he can. When we reflect
that men without mutual help, or the aid of reason, must needs live most
miserably, as we clearly proved in Chap. V., we shall plainly see that
men must necessarily come to an agreement to live together as securely
and well as possible if they are to enjoy as a whole the rights which naturally
belong to them as individuals, and their life should be no more conditioned
by the force and desire of individuals, but by the power and will of the
whole body. This end they will be unable to attain if desire be their only
guide (for by the laws of desire each man is drawn in a different direction);
they must, therefore, most firmly decree and establish that they will be
guided in everything by reason (which nobody will dare openly to repudiate
lest he should be taken for a madman), and will restrain any desire which
is injurious to a man's fellows, that they will do to all as they would
be done by, and that they will defend their neighbour's rights as their
own.
How such a compact as this should be entered into, how ratified and
established, we will now inquire.
Now it is a universal law of human nature that no one ever neglects
anything which he judges to be good, except with the hope of gaining a
greater good, or from the fear of a greater evil; nor does anyone endure
an evil except for the sake of avoiding a greater evil, or gaining a greater
good. That is, everyone will, of two goods, choose that which he thinks
the greatest; and, of two evils, that which he thinks the least. I say
advisedly that which he thinks the greatest or the least, for it does not
necessarily follow that he judges right. This law is so deeply implanted
in the human mind that it ought to be counted among eternal truths and
axioms.
As a necessary consequence of the principle just enunciated, no one
can honestly promise to forego the right which he has over all things and
in general no one will abide by his promises, unless under the fear of
a greater evil, or the hope of a greater good. ) An example will make the
matter clearer. Suppose that a robber forces me to promise that I will
give him my goods at his will and pleasure. It is plain (inasmuch as my
natural right is, as I have shown, co-extensive with my power) that if
I can free myself from this robber by stratagem, by assenting to his demands,
I have the natural right to do so, and to pretend to accept his conditions.
Or again, suppose I have genuinely promised someone that for the space
of twenty days I will not taste food or any nourishment; and suppose I
afterwards find that was foolish, and cannot be kept without very great
injury to myself; as I am bound by natural law and right to choose the
least of two evils, I have complete right to break my compact, and act
as if my promise had never been uttered. I say that I should have perfect
natural right to do so, whether I was actuated by true and evident reason,
or whether I was actuated by mere opinion in thinking I had promised rashly;
whether my reasons were true or false, I should be in fear of a greater
evil, which, by the ordinance of nature, I should strive to avoid by every
means in my power.
We may, therefore, conclude that a compact is only made valid by its
utility, without which it becomes null and void. It is, therefore, foolish
to ask a man to keep his faith with us for ever, unless we also endeavour
that the violation of the compact we enter into shall involve for the violator
more harm than good. This consideration should have very great weight in
forming a state. However, if all men could be easily led by reason alone,
and could recognize what is best and most useful for a state, there would
be no one who would not forswear deceit, for everyone would keep most religiously
to their compact in their desire for the chief good, namely, the shield
and buckler of the commonwealth. However, it is far from being the case
that all men can always be easily led by reason alone; everyone is drawn
away by his pleasure, while avarice, ambition, envy, hatred, and the like
so engross the mind that reason has no place therein. Hence, though men
make promises with all the appearances of good faith, and agree that they
will keep to their engagement, no one can absolutely rely on another man's
promise unless there is something behind it. Everyone has by nature a right
to act deceitfully. and to break his compacts, unless he be restrained
by the hope of some greater good, or the fear of some greater evil.
However, as we have shown that the natural right of the individual
is only limited by his power, it is clear that by transferring, either
willingly or under compulsion, this power into the hands of another, he
in so doing necessarily cedes also a part of his right; and further, that
the Sovereign right over all men belongs to him who has sovereign power,
wherewith he can compel men by force, or restrain them by threats of the
universally feared punishment of death; such sovereign right he will retain
only so long as he can maintain his power of enforcing his will; otherwise
he will totter on his throne, and no one who is stronger than he will be
bound unwillingly to obey him.
In this manner a society can be formed without any violation of natural
right, and the covenant can always be strictly kept - that is, if each
individual hands over the whole of his power to the body politic, the latter
will then possess sovereign natural right over all things; that is, it
will have sole and unquestioned dominion, and everyone will be bound to
obey, under pain of the severest punishment. A body politic of this kind
is called a Democracy, which may be defined as a society which wields all
its power as a whole. The sovereign power is not restrained by any laws,
but everyone is bound to obey it in all things; such is the state of things
implied when men either tacitly or expressly handed over to it all their
power of self-defence, or in other
words, all their right. For if they had wished to retain any right
for themselves, they ought to have taken precautions for its defence and
preservation; as they have not done so, and indeed could not have done
so without dividing and consequently ruining the state, they placed themselves
absolutely at the mercy of the sovereign power; and, therefore, having
acted (as we have shown) as reason and necessity demanded, they are obliged
to fulfil the commands of the sovereign power, however absurd these may
be, else they will be public enemies, and will act against reason, which
urges the preservation of the state as a primary duty. For reason bids
us choose the least of two evils.
Furthermore, this danger of submitting absolutely to the dominion and
will of another, is one which may be incurred with a light heart: for we
have shown that sovereigns only possess this right of imposing their will,
so long as they have the full power to enforce it: if such power be lost
their right to command is lost also, or lapses to those who have assumed
it and can keep it. Thus it is very rare for sovereigns to impose thoroughly
irrational commands, for they are bound to consult their own interests,
and retain their power by consulting the public good and acting according
to the dictates of reason, as Seneca says, "violenta imperia nemo continuit
diu." No one can long retain a tyrant's sway.
In a democracy, irrational commands are still less to be feared: for
it is almost impossible that the majority of a people, especially if it
be a large one, should agree in an irrational design: and, moreover, the
basis and aim of a democracy is to avoid the desires as irrational, and
to bring men as far as possible under the control of reason, so that they
may live in peace and harmony: if this basis be removed the whole fabric
falls to ruin.
Such being the ends in view for the sovereign power, the duty of subjects
is, as I have said, to obey its commands, and to recognize no right save
that which it sanctions.
It will, perhaps, be thought that we are turning subjects into slaves:
for slaves obey commands and free men live as they like; but this idea
is based on a misconception, for the true slave is he who is led away by
his pleasures and can neither see what is good for him nor act accordingly:
he alone is free who lives with free consent under the entire guidance
of reason.
Action in obedience to orders does take away freedom in a certain sense,
but it does not, therefore, make a man a slave, all depends on the object
of the action. If the object of the action be the good of the state, and
not the good of the agent, the latter is a slave and does himself no good:
but in a state or kingdom where the weal of the whole people, and not that
of the ruler, is the supreme law, obedience to the sovereign power does
not make a man a slave, of no use to himself, but a subject. Therefore,
that state is the freest whose laws are founded on sound reason, so that
every member of it may, if he will, be free; that is, live with full consent
under the entire guidance of reason.
Children, though they are bound to obey all the commands of their parents,
are yet not slaves: for the commands of parents look generally to the children's
benefit.
We must, therefore, acknowledge a great difference between a slave,
a son, and a subject; their positions may be thus defined. A slave is one
who is bound to obey his master's orders, though they are given solely
in the master's interest: a son is one who obeys his father's orders, given
in his own interest; a subject obeys the orders of the sovereign power,
given for the common interest, wherein he is included.
I think I have now shown sufficiently clearly the basis of a democracy:
I have especially desired to do so, for I believe it to be of all forms
of government the most natural, and the most consonant with individual
liberty. In it no one transfers his natural right so absolutely that he
has no further voice in affairs, he only hands it over to the majority
of a society, whereof he is a unit. Thus all men remain as they were in
the state of nature, equals.
This is the only form of government which I have treated of at length,
for it is the one most akin to my purpose of showing the benefits of freedom
in a state.
I may pass over the fundamental principles of other forms of government,
for we may gather from what has been said whence their right arises without
going into its origin. The possessor of sovereign power, whether he be
one, or many, or the whole body politic, has the sovereign right of imposing
any commands he pleases: and he who has either voluntarily, or under compulsion,
transferred the right to defend him to another, has, in so doing, renounced
his natural right and is therefore bound to obey, in all things, the commands
of the sovereign power; and will be bound so to do so
as the king, or nobles, or the people preserve the sovereign power
which formed the basis of the original transfer. I need add no more.
The bases and rights of dominion being thus displayed, we shall readily
be able to define private civil right, wrong, justice, and injustice, with
their relations to the state; and also to determine what constitutes an
ally, or an enemy, or the crime of treason.
By private civil right we can only mean the liberty every man possesses
to preserve his existence, a liberty limited by the edicts of the sovereign
power, and preserved only by its authority: for when a man has transferred
to another his right of living as he likes, which was only limited by his
power, that is, has transferred his liberty and power of self-defence,
he is bound to live as that other dictates, and to trust to him entirely
for his defence. Wrong takes place when a citizen, or subject, is forced
by another to undergo some loss or pain in contradiction to the authority
of the law, or the edict of the sovereign power.
Wrong is conceivable only in an organized community: nor can it ever
accrue to subjects from any act of the sovereign, who has the right to
do what he likes. It can only arise, therefore, between private persons,
who are bound by law and right not to injure one another. Justice consists
in the habitual rendering to every man his lawful due: injustice consists
in depriving a man, under the pretence of legality, of what the laws, rightly
interpreted, would allow him. These last are also called equity and iniquity,
because those who administer the laws are bound to show no respect of persons,
but to account all men equal, and to defend every man's right equally,
neither envying the rich nor despising the poor.
The men of two states become allies, when for the sake of avoiding
war, or for some other advantage, they covenant to do each other no hurt,
but on the contrary, to assist each other if necessity arises, each retaining
his independence. Such a covenant is valid so long as its basis of danger
or advantage is in force: no one enters into an engagement, or is bound
to stand by his compacts unless there be a hope of some accruing good,
or the fear of some evil: if this basis be removed the compact thereby
becomes void: this has been abundantly shown by experience. For although
different states make treaties not to harm one another, they always take
every possible precaution against such treaties being broken by the stronger
party, and do not rely on the compact, unless there is a sufficiently obvious
object and advantage to both parties in observing it. Otherwise they would
fear a breach of faith, nor would there be any wrong done thereby: for
who in his proper senses, and aware of the right of the sovereign power,
would trust in the promises of one who has the will and the power to do
what he likes, and who aims solely at the safety and advantage of his dominion?
Moreover, if we consult loyalty and religion, we shall see that no one
in possession of power ought to abide by his promises to the injury of
his dominion; for he cannot keep such promises without breaking the engagement
he made with his subjects, by which both he and they are most solemnly
bound.
An enemy is one who lives apart from the state, and does not recognize
its authority either as a subject or as an ally. It is not hatred which
makes a man an enemy, but the rights of the state. The rights of the state
are the same in regard to him who does not recognize by any compact the
state authority, as they are against him who has done the state an injury:
it has the right to force him as best it can, either to submit, or to contract
an alliance.
Lastly, treason can only be committed by subjects, who by compact,
either tacit or expressed, have transferred all their rights to the state:
a subject is said to have committed this crime when he has attempted, for
whatever reason, to seize the sovereign power, or to place it in different
hands. I say, has attempted, for if punishment were not to overtake him
till he had succeeded, it would often come too late, the sovereign rights
would have been acquired or transferred already.
I also say, has attempted, for whatever reason, to seize the sovereign
power , and I recognize no difference whether such an attempt should
be followed by public loss or public gain. Whatever be his reason for acting,
the crime is treason, and he is rightly condemned: in war, everyone would
admit the justice of his sentence. If a man does not keep to his post,
but approaches the enemy without the knowledge of his commander, whatever
may be his motive, so long as he acts on his own motion, even if he advances
with the design of defeating the enemy, he is rightly put to death, because
he has violated his oath, and infringed the rights of his commander. That
all citizens are equally bound by these rights in time of peace, is not
so generally recognized, but the reasons for obedience are in both cases
identical. The state must be preserved and directed by the sole authority
of the sovereign, and such authority and right have been accorded by universal
consent to him alone: if, therefore, anyone else attempts, without his
consent, to execute any public enterprise, even though the state might
(as we said) reap benefit therefrom, such person has none the less infringed
the sovereigns right, and would be rightly punished for treason.
In order that every scruple may be removed, we may now answer the inquiry,
whether our former assertion that everyone who has not the practice of
reason, may, in the state of nature, live by sovereign natural right, according
to the laws of his desires, is not in direct opposition to the law and
right of God as revealed. For as all men absolutely (whether they be less
endowed with reason or more) are equally bound by the Divine command to
love their neighbour as themselves, it may be said that they cannot, without
wrong, do injury to anyone, or live according to their desires.
This objection, so far as the state of nature is concerned, can be
easily answered, for the state of nature is, both in nature and in time,
prior to religion. No one knows by nature that he owes any obedience to
God nor can he attain thereto by any exercise of his reason, but solely
by revelation confirmed by signs. Therefore, previous to revelation, no
one is bound by a Divine law and right of which he is necessarily in ignorance.
The state of nature must by no means be confounded with a state of religion,
but must be conceived as without either religion or law, and consequently
without sin or wrong: this is how we have described it, and we are confirmed
by the authority of Paul. It is not only in respect of ignorance that we
conceive the state of nature as prior to, and lacking the Divine revealed
law and right; but in respect of freedom also, wherewith all men are born
endowed.
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CHAPTER XVII - IT IS SHOWN THAT NO ONE CAN, OR NEED, TRANSFER ALL HIS RIGHTS TO THE SOVEREIGN POWER. OF THE HEBREW REPUBLIC, AS IT WAS DURING THE LIFETIME OF MOSES, AND AFTER HIS DEATH, TILL THE FOUNDATION OF THE MONARCHY; AND OF ITS EXCELLENCE. LASTLY, OF THE CAUSES WHY THE THEOCRATIC REPUBLIC FELL, AND WHY IT COULD HARDLY HAVE CONTINUED WITHOUT DISSENSION.
The theory put forward in the last chapter, of the universal rights
of the sovereign power, and of the natural rights of the individual transferred
thereto, though it corresponds in many respects with actual practice, and
though practice may be so arranged as to conform to it more and more, must
nevertheless always remain in many respects purely ideal. No one can ever
so utterly transfer to another his power and, consequently, his rights,
as to cease to be a man; nor can there ever be a power so sovereign that
it can carry out every possible wish. It will always be vain to order a
subject to hate what he believes brings him advantage, or to love what
brings him loss, or not to be offended at insults, or not to wish to be
free from fear, or a hundred other things of the sort, which necessarily
follow from the laws of human nature.
So much, I think, is abundantly shown by experience: for men have never
so far ceded their power as to cease to be an object of fear to the rulers
who received such power and right; and dominions have always been in as
much danger from their own subjects as from external enemies. If it were
really the case, that men could be deprived of their natural rights so
utterly as never to have any further influence on affairs except with the
permission of the holders of sovereign right, it would then be possible
to maintain with impunity the most violent tyranny, which, I suppose, no
one would for an instant admit.
We must, therefore, grant that every man retains some part of his right,
in dependence on his own decision, and no one else's.
However, in order correctly to understand the extent of the sovereign's
right and power, we must take notice that it does not cover only those
actions to which it can compel men by fear, but absolutely every action
which it can induce men to perform: for it is the fact of obedience, not
the motive for obedience, which makes a man a subject.
Whatever be the cause which leads a man to obey the commands of the
sovereign, whether it be fear or hope, or love of his country, or any other
emotion - the fact remains that the man takes counsel with himself, and
nevertheless acts as his sovereign orders. We must not, therefore, assert
that all actions resulting from a man's deliberation with himself are done
in obedience to the rights of the individual rather than the sovereign:
as a matter of fact, all actions spring from a man's deliberation with
himself, whether the determining motive be love or fear of punishment;
therefore, either dominion does not exist, and has no rights over its subjects,
or else it extends over every instance in which it can prevail on men to
decide to obey it. Consequently,
every action which a subject performs in accordance with the commands
of the sovereign, whether such action springs from love, or fear, or (as
is more frequently the case) from hope and fear together, or from reverence.
compounded of fear and admiration, or, indeed, any motive whatever, is
performed in virtue of his submission to
the sovereign, and not in virtue of his own authority.
This point is made still more clear by the fact that obedience does
not consist so much in the outward act as in the mental state of the person
obeying; so that he is most under the dominion of another who with his
whole heart determines to obey another's commands; and consequently the
firmest dominion belongs to the sovereign who has most influence over the
minds of his subjects; if those who are most feared possessed the firmest
dominion, the firmest dominion would belong to the subjects of a tyrant,
for they are always greatly feared by their ruler. Furthermore, though
it is impossible to govern the mind as completely as the tongue, nevertheless
minds are, to a certain extent, under the control of the sovereign, for
he can in many ways bring about that the greatest part of his subjects
should follow his wishes in their beliefs, their loves,
and their hates. Though such emotions do not arise at the express command
of the sovereign they often result (as experience shows) from the authority
of his power, and from his direction; in other words, in virtue of his
right; we may, therefore, without doing violence to our understanding,
conceive men who follow the instigation of their sovereign in their beliefs,
their loves, their hates, their contempt, and all other emotions whatsoever.
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CHAPTER XIX - IT IS SHOWN THAT THE RIGHT OVER MATTERSSPIRITUAL LIES WHOLLY WITH THE SOVEREIGN, AND THAT THE OUTWARD FORMS OF RELIGION SHOULD BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH PUBLIC PEACE, IF WE WOULD OBEY GOD ARIGHT.
When I said that the possessors of sovereign power have rights over
everything, and that all rights are dependent on their decree, I did not
merely mean temporal rights, but also spiritual rights; of the latter,
no less than the former, they ought to be the interpreters and the champions.
I wish to draw special attention to this point, and to discuss it fully
in this chapter, because many persons deny that the right of deciding religious
questions belongs to the sovereign power, and refuse to acknowledge it
as the interpreter of Divine right. They accordingly assume full licence
to accuse and arraign it, nay, even to excommunicate it from the Church,
as Ambrosius treated the Emperor Theodosius in old time. However, I will
show later on in this chapter that
they take this means of dividing the government, and paving the way
to their own ascendancy.
.........
We cannot, therefore, doubt that the daily sacred rites (whose performance
does not require a particular genealogy but only a special mode of life,
and from which the holders of sovereign power are not excluded as unclean)
are under the sole control of the sovereign power; no one, save by the
authority or concession of such sovereign, has the right or power of administering
them, of choosing others to administer them, of defining or strengthening
the foundations of the Church and her doctrines; of judging on questions
of morality or acts of piety; of receiving anyone into the Church or excommunicating
him therefrom, or, lastly, of providing for the poor.
These doctrines are proved to be not only true (as we have already
pointed out), but also of primary necessity for the preservation of religion
and the state. We all know what weight spiritual right and authority carries
in the popular mind: how everyone hangs on the lips, as it were, of those
who possess it. We may even say that those who wield such authority have
the most complete sway over the popular mind.
Whosoever, therefore, wishes to take this right away from the sovereign
power, is desirous of dividing the dominion; from such division, contentions,
and strife will necessarily spring up, as they did of old between the Jewish
kings and high priests, and will defy all attempts to allay them. Nay,
further, he who strives to deprive the sovereign power of such authority,
is aiming (as we have said), at gaining dominion for
himself. What is left for the sovereign power to decide on, if this
right be denied him? Certainly nothing concerning either war or peace,
if he has to ask another man's opinion as to whether what he believes to
be beneficial would be pious or impious. Everything would depend on the
verdict of him who had the right of deciding and judging what was pious
or impious, right or wrong.
........
CHAPTER XX - THAT IN A FREE STATE EVERY MAN MAY THINK WHAT HE LIKES, AND SAY WHAT HE THINKS.
If men's minds were as easily controlled as their tongues, every king
would sit safely on his throne, and government by compulsion would cease;
for every subject would shape his life according to the intentions of his
rulers, and would esteem a thing true or false, good or evil, just or unjust,
in obedience to their dictates. However, we have shown already (Chapter
XVII) that no man's mind can possibly lie wholly at the disposition of
another, for no one can willingly transfer his natural right of free reason
and judgment, or be compelled so to do. For this reason government
which attempts to control minds is accounted tyrannical, and it is considered
an abuse of sovereignty and a usurpation of the rights of subjects, to
seek to prescribe what shall be accepted as true, or rejected as false,
or what opinions should actuate men in their worship of God. All these
questions fall within a man's natural right, which he cannot abdicate even
with his own consent.
I admit that the judgment can be biassed in many ways, and to an almost
incredible degree, so that while exempt from direct external control it
may be so dependent on another man's words, that it may fitly be said to
be ruled by him; but although this influence is carried to great lengths,
it has never gone so far as to invalidate the statement, that every man's
understanding is his own, and that brains are as diverse as palates.
Moses, not by fraud, but by Divine virtue, gained such a hold over
the popular judgment that he was accounted superhuman, and believed to
speak and act through the inspiration of the Deity; nevertheless, even
he could not escape murmurs and evil
interpretations. How much less then can other monarchs avoid them!
Yet such unlimited power, if it exists at all, must belong to a monarch,
and least of all to a democracy, where the whole or a great part of the
people wield authority collectively.
This is a fact which I think everyone can explain for himself.
However unlimited, therefore, the power of a sovereign may be, however
implicitly it is trusted as the exponent of law and religion, it can never
prevent men from forming judgments according to their intellect, or being
influenced by any given emotion. It is true that it has the right to treat
as enemies all men whose opinions do not, on all subjects, entirely coincide
with its own; but we are not discussing its strict rights, but its proper
course of action. I grant that it has the right to rule in the most violent
manner, and to put citizens to death for very trivial causes, but no one
supposes it can do this with the approval of sound judgment. Nay, inasmuch
as such things cannot be done without extreme peril to itself, we may even
deny that it has the absolute power to do them, or, consequently, the absolute
right; for the rights of the sovereign are limited by his power.
Since, therefore, no one can abdicate his freedom of judgment and feeling;
since every man is by indefeasible natural right the master of his own
thoughts, it follows that men thinking in diverse and contradictory fashions,
cannot, without disastrous results, be compelled to speak only according
to the dictates of the supreme power. Not even the most experienced, to
say nothing of the multitude, know how to keep silence. Men's common failing
is to confide their plans to others, though there be need for secrecy,
so that a government would be most harsh which deprived the individual
of his freedom of saying and teaching what he thought; and would be moderate
if such freedom were granted. Still we cannot deny that authority may be
as much injured by words as by actions; hence, although the freedom we
are discussing cannot be entirely denied to subjects, its unlimited concession
would be most baneful; we must, therefore, now inquire, how far such freedom
can and ought to be conceded without danger to the peace of the state,
or the power of the rulers; and this, as I aid at the beginning of Chapter
XVI., is my principal object.
It follows, plainly, from the explanation given above, of the foundations
of a state, that the ultimate aim of government is not to rule, or restrain,
by fear, nor to exact obedience, but contrariwise, to free every man from
fear, that he may live in all possible security; in other words, to strengthen
his natural right to exist and work - without injury to himself or others.
No, the object of government is not to change men from rational beings
into beasts or puppets, but to enable them to develope their minds and
bodies in security, and to employ their reason unshackled; neither showing
hatred, anger, or deceit, nor watched with the eyes of jealousy and injustice.
In fact, the true aim of government is liberty.
Now we have seen that in forming a state the power of king laws must
either be vested in the body of the citizens, or in a portion of them,
or in one man. For, although mens free judgments are very diverse, each
one thinking that he alone knows everything, and although complete unanimity
of feeling and speech is out of the question, it is impossible to preserve
peace, unless individuals abdicate their right of acting entirely on their
own judgment. Therefore, the individual justly cedes the right of free
action, though not of free reason and judgment; no one can act against
the
authorities without danger to the state, though his feelings and judgment
may be at variance therewith; he may even speak against them, provided
that he does so from rational conviction, not from fraud, anger, or hatred,
and provided that he does not attempt to introduce any change on his private
authority.
For instance, supposing a man shows that a law is repugnant to sound
reason, and should therefore be repealed; if he submits his opinion to
the judgment of the authorities (who, alone, have the right of making and
repealing laws), and meanwhile acts in nowise contrary to that law, he
has deserved well of the state, and has behaved as a good citizen should;
but if he accuses the authorities of injustice, and stirs up the people
against them, or if he seditiously strives to abrogate the law without
their consent, he is a mere agitator and rebel.
Thus we see how an individual may declare and teach what he believes,
without injury to the authority of his rulers, or to the public peace;
namely, by leaving in their hands the entire power of legislation as it
affects action, and by doing nothing against their laws, though he be compelled
often to act in contradiction to what he believes, and openly feels, to
be best.
Such a course can be taken without detriment to justice and dutifulness,
nay, it is the one which a just and dutiful man would adopt. We have shown
that justice is dependent on the laws of the authorities, so that no one
who contravenes their accepted decrees can be just, while the highest regard
for duty, as we have pointed out in the preceding chapter, is exercised
in maintaining public peace and tranquillity; these could not be preserved
if every man were to live as he pleased; therefore it
is no less than undutiful for a man to act contrary to his country's
laws, for if the practice became universal the ruin of states would necessarily
follow.
Hence, so long as a man acts in obedience to the laws of his rulers,
he in nowise contravenes his reason, for in obedience to reason he transferred
the right of controlling his actions from his own hands to theirs. This
doctrine we can confirm from actual custom, for in a conference of great
and small powers, schemes are seldom carried unanimously, yet all unite
in carrying out what is decided on, whether they voted for or against.
But I return to my proposition.
From the fundamental notions of a state, we have discovered how a man
may exercise free judgment without detriment to the supreme power: from
the same premises we can no less easily determine what opinions would be
seditious. Evidently those which by their very nature nullify the compact
by which the right of free action was ceded. For instance, a man who holds
that the supreme power has no rights over him, or that promises ought not
to be kept, or that everyone should live as he pleases, or other doctrines
of this nature in direct opposition to the above-mentioned contract, is
seditious, not so much from his actual opinions and judgment, as from the
deeds which they involve; for he who maintains such theories abrogates
the contract which tacitly, or openly, he made with his rulers. Other opinions
which do not involve acts violating the contract, such as revenge, anger,
and the like, are not seditious, unless it be in some corrupt state, where
superstitious and ambitious persons, unable to endure men of learning,
are so popular with the multitude that their word is more valued than the
law.
However, I do not deny that there are some doctrines which, while they
are apparently only concerned with abstract truths and falsehoods, are
yet propounded and published with unworthy motives. This question we have
discussed in Chapter XV., and shown that reason should nevertheless remain
unshackled. If we hold to the
principle that a man's loyalty to the state should be judged, like
his loyalty to God, from his actions only - namely, from his charity towards
his neighbours; we cannot doubt that the best government will allow freedom
of philosophical speculation no less than of belief. I confess that from
such freedom inconveniences may sometimes arise, but what question was
ever settled so wisely that no abuse could possibly spring therefrom? He
who seeks to regulate everything by law, is more likely to arouse vices
than to reform them. It is best to grant what cannot be abolished, even
though it be in itself harmful. How many evils spring from luxury, envy,
avarice, drunkenness, and the like, yet these are tolerated - vices as
they are - because they cannot be prevented by legal enactments. How much
more then should free thought be granted, seeing that it is in itself a
virtue and that it cannot be crushed! Besides the evil results can easily
be checked, as I will show, by the secular authorities, not to mention
that such freedom is absolutely necessary for progress in science and the
liberal arts: for no man follows such pursuits to advantage unless his
judgment be entirely free and unhampered.
But let it be granted that freedom may be crushed, and men be so bound
down, that they do not dare to utter a whisper, save at the bidding of
their rulers; nevertheless this can never be carried to the pitch of making
them think according to authority, so that the necessary consequences would
be that men would daily be thinking one thing and saying another, to the
corruption of good faith, that mainstay of government, and to the fostering
of hateful flattery and perfidy, whence spring stratagems, and the corruption
of every good art.
It is far from possible to impose uniformity of speech, for the more
rulers strive to curtail freedom of speech, the more obstinately are they
resisted; not indeed by the avaricious, the flatterers, and other numskulls,
who think supreme salvation consists in filling their stomachs and gloating
over their money-bags, but by those whom good education, sound morality,
and virtue have rendered more free. Men, as generally constituted, are
most prone to resent the branding as criminal of opinions which they believe
to be true, and the proscription as wicked of that which inspires them
with piety towards God and man; hence they are ready to forswear the laws
and conspire
against the authorities, thinking it not shameful but honourable to
stir up seditions and perpetuate any sort of crime with this end in view.
Such being the constitution of human nature, we see that laws directed
against opinions affect the generous minded rather than the wicked, and
are adapted less for coercing criminals than for irritating the upright;
so that they cannot be maintained without great peril to the state.
Moreover, such laws are almost always useless, for those who hold that
the opinions proscribed are sound, cannot possibly obey the law; whereas
those who already reject them as false, accept the law as a kind of privilege,
and make such boast of it, that authority is powerless to repeal it, even
if such a course be subsequently desired.
To these considerations may be added what we said in Chapter XVIII.
in treating of the history of the Hebrews. And, lastly, how many schisms
have arisen in the Church from the attempt of the authorities to decide
by law the intricacies of theological controversy! If men were not allured
by the hope of getting the law and the authorities on their side, of triumphing
over their adversaries in the sight of an applauding multitude, and of
acquiring honourable distinctions, they would not strive so maliciously,
nor would such fury sway their minds. This is taught not only by reason
but by daily examples, for laws of this kind prescribing what every man
shall believe and forbidding anyone to speak or write to the contrary,
have often been passed, as sops or concessions to the anger of those who
cannot tolerate men of enlightenment, and who, by such harsh and crooked
enactments, can easily turn the devotion of the masses into fury and direct
it against whom they will.
How much better would it be to restrain popular anger and fury, instead
of passing useless laws, which can only be broken by those who love virtue
and the liberal arts, thus paring down the state till it is too small to
harbour men of talent. What greater misfortune for a state can be conceived
then that honourable men should be sent like criminals into exile, because
they hold diverse opinions which they cannot
disguise? What, I say, can be more hurtful than that men who have committed
no crime or wickedness should, simply because they are enlightened, be
treated as enemies and put to death, and that the scaffold, the terror
of evil-doers, should become the arena where the highest examples of tolerance
and virtue are displayed to the people with all the marks of ignominy that
authority can devise?
He that knows himself to be upright does not fear the death of a criminal,
and shrinks from no punishment; his mind is not wrung with remorse for
any disgraceful deed: he holds that death in a good cause is no punishment,
but an honour, and that death for freedom is glory.
What purpose then is served by the death of such men, what example
in proclaimed? the cause for which they die is unknown to the idle and
the foolish, hateful to the turbulent, loved by the upright. The only lesson
we can draw from such scenes is to flatter the persecutor, or else to imitate
the victim.
If formal assent is not to be esteemed above conviction, and if governments
are to retain a firm hold of authority and not be compelled to yield to
agitators, it is imperative that freedom of judgment should be granted,
so that men may live together in harmony, however diverse, or even openly
contradictory their opinions may be. We cannot doubt that such is the best
system of government and open to the fewest objections, since it is the
one most in harmony with human nature. In a democracy
(the most natural form of government, as we have shown in Chapter XVI.)
everyone submits to the control of authority over his actions, but not
over his judgment and reason; that is, seeing that all cannot think alike,
the voice of the majority has the force of law, subject to repeal if circumstances
bring about a change of opinion. In proportion as the power of free judgment
is withheld we depart from the natural condition of mankind, and consequently
the government becomes more tyrannical.
In order to prove that from such freedom no inconvenience arises, which
cannot easily be checked by the exercise of the sovereign power, and that
men's actions can easily be kept in bounds, though their opinions be at
open variance, it will be well to cite an example. Such an one is not very
far to seek. The city of Amsterdam reaps the fruit of this freedom in its
own great prosperity and in the admiration of all other people. For in
this most flourishing state, and most splendid city, men of every nation
and religion live together in the greatest harmony, and ask no questions
before trusting their goods to a fellow- citizen, save whether he be rich
or poor, and whether he generally acts honestly, or the reverse. His religion
and sect is considered of no importance: for it has no effect before the
judges in gaining or losing a cause, and there is no sect so despised that
its followers, provided that they harm no one, pay every man his due, and
live uprightly, are deprived of the protection of the magisterial authority.
On the other hand, when the religious controversy between Remonstrants
and Counter-Remonstrants began to be taken up by politicians and the States,
it grew into a schism, and abundantly showed that laws dealing with religion
and seeking to settle its controversies are much more calculated to irritate
than to reform, and that they give rise to extreme licence: further, it
was seen that schisms do not originate in a love of truth, which is a source
of courtesy and gentleness, but rather in an inordinate desire for supremacy.
From all these considerations it is clearer than the sun at noonday, that
the true schismatics are those who condemn other men's writings, and seditiously
stir up the quarrelsome masses against their authors, rather than those
authors themselves, who generally write only for the learned, and appeal
solely to reason. In fact, the real disturbers of the peace are those who,
in a free state, seek to curtail the liberty of judgment which they are
unable to tyrannize over.
I have thus shown:-
I. That it is impossible to deprive men of the liberty of saying what
they think.
II. That such liberty can be conceded to every man without injury to
the rights and authority of the sovereign power, and that every man may
retain it without injury to such rights, provided that he does not presume
upon it to the extent of introducing
any new rights into the state, or acting in any way contrary, to the
existing laws.
III. That every man may enjoy this liberty without detriment to the
public peace, and that no inconveniences arise therefrom which cannot easily
be checked.
IV. That every man may enjoy it without injury to his allegiance.
V. That laws dealing with speculative problems are entirely useless.
VI. Lastly, that not only may such liberty be granted without prejudice
to the public peace, to loyalty, and to the rights of rulers, but that
it is even necessary for their
preservation.
For when people try to take it away, and bring to trial, not only the
acts which alone are capable of offending, but also the opinions of mankind,
they only succeed in surrounding their victims with an appearance of martyrdom,
and raise feelings of pity and revenge rather than of terror. Uprightness
and good faith are thus corrupted, flatterers and traitors are encouraged,
and sectarians triumph, inasmuch as concessions have been made to their
animosity, and they have gained the state
sanction for the doctrines of which they are the interpreters. Hence
they arrogate to themselves the state authority and rights, and do not
scruple to assert that they have been directly chosen by God, and that
their laws are Divine, whereas the laws of the state are human, and should
therefore yield obedience to the laws of God - in other words, to their
own laws. Everyone must see that this is not a state of affairs conducive
to public welfare. Wherefore, as we have shown in Chapter XVIII., the safest
way for a state is to lay down the rule that religion is comprised solely
in the exercise of charity and justice, and that the rights of rulers in
sacred, no less than in secular matters, should merely have to do with
actions, but that every man should think what he likes and say what he
thinks.
I have thus fulfilled the task I set myself in this treatise. It remains
only to call attention to the fact that I have written nothing which I
do not most willingly submit to the examination and approval of my country's
rulers; and that I am willing to retract anything which they shall decide
to be repugnant to the laws, or prejudicial to the public good. I know
that I am a man, and as a man liable to error, but against error I have
taken scrupulous care, and have striven to keep in entire accordance with
the laws of my country, with loyalty, and with morality.