What follows is a heavily abridged version of Roe v. Wade, the landmark 1973 US Supreme Court decision legalizing abortion.  I have eliminated footnotes as well as concurring and dissenting opinions.
“Jane Roe” was a fictitious name given to a woman who challenged the constitutionality of various criminal statutes of the state of Texas regarding abortion.  She claimed that she could not get a safe abortion in Texas because the pregnancy did not threaten her life; moreover, she lacked the money to travel to another state where abortion for women in her situation was legal.
Here's the Texas statute under attack.

"Article 1191.  Abortion.

"If any person shall designedly administer to a pregnant woman or knowingly procure to be administered with her consent any drug or medicine, or shall use towards her any violence or means whatever externally or internally applied, and thereby procure an abortion, he shall be confined in the penitentiary not less than two nor more than five years; if it be done without her consent, the punishment shall be doubled.  By 'abortion' is meant that the life of the fetus or embryo shall be destroyed in the woman's womb or that a premature birth thereof be caused.

"Art. 1192.  Furnishing the means

"Whoever furnishes the means for procuring an abortion knowing the purpose intended is guilty as an accomplice.

"Art. 1193.  Attempt at abortion

"If the means used shall fail to produce an abortion, the offender is nevertheless guilty of an attempt to produce abortion, provided it be shown that such means were calculated to produce that result, and shall be fined not less than one hundred nor more than one thousand dollars.

"Art. 1194.  Murder in producing abortion

"If the death of the mother is occasioned by an abortion so produced by medical advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother."

"Art. 1196.  By medical advice

"Nothing in this chapter applies to an abortion procured or attempted by medical advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother."
 

Here's the (abridged) opinion of the court.
 
 

Mr. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the court.

    Three reasons have been advanced to explain historically the enactment of criminal abortion laws in the 19th century and to justify their continued existence.

    It has been argued occasionally that these laws were the product of a Victorian social concern to discourage illicit sexual conduct. Texas, however, does not advance this justification in the present case, and it appears that no court or commentator has taken the argument seriously.  The appellants and amici contend, moreover, that this is not a proper state purpose at all and suggest that, if it were, the Texas statutes are overbroad in protecting it since the law fails to distinguish between married and unwed mothers.

    A second reason is concerned with abortion as a medical procedure.  When most criminal abortion laws were first enacted, the procedure was a hazardous one for the woman.  This was particularly true prior to the development of antisepsis... Thus, it has been argued that a state's real concern in enacting a criminal abortion law was to protect the pregnant woman, that is, to restrain her from submitting to a procedure that placed her life in serious jeopardy.

    Modern medical techniques have altered this situation...  Consequently, any interest of the state in protecting the woman from an inherently hazardous procedure except when it would be equally dangerous for her to forgo it, has largely disappeared.  Of course, important state interests in the areas of health and medical standards do remain.  The state has a legitimate interest in seeing to it that abortion, like any other medical procedure, is performed under circumstances that insure maximum safety for the patient....  The prevalence of high mortality rates at illegal "abortion mills" strengthens, rather than weaken, the state's interest in regulating the conditions under which abortions are performed.  Moreover, the risk to the woman increases as her pregnancy continues.  Thus, the state retains a definite interest in protecting the woman's own health and safety when an abortion is proposed at a late stage of pregnancy.

    The third reason is the state's interest-- some phrase it in terms of duty-- in protecting prenatal life.  Some of the argument for this justification rests on the theory that a new human life is present from the moment of conception. The state's interest and general obligation to protect life then extends, it is argued, to prenatal  life.  Only when the life of the pregnant mother herself is at stake, balanced against the life she carries within her, should the interest of the embryo or fetus not prevail.  Logically, of course, a legitimate state interest in this area need not stand or fall on acceptance of the belief that life begins at conception or at some other point prior to live birth.  In assessing the state's interest, recognition may be given to the less rigid claim that as long as at least potential life is involved, the state may assert interests beyond the protection of the pregnant woman alone.

    Parties challenging state abortion laws have sharply disputed in some courts the contention that a purpose of these laws, when enacted, was to protect prenatal life.  Pointing to the absence of legislative history to support the contention, they claim that most state laws were designed solely to protect the woman.  because medical advances have lessened this concern, at least with respect to abortion in early pregnancy, they argue that with respect to such abortions the laws can no longer be justified by any state interest.  There is some scholarly support for this view of original purpose. The few state courts called upon to interpret their laws in the late 19th and early 20th centuries did focus on the state's interest in protecting the woman's health rather than in preserving the embryo and fetus.  Proponents of this view point out that in many states, including Texas, by statute or judicial interpretation, the pregnant woman
herself could not be prosecuted for self-abortion or for cooperating in an abortion performed upon her by another. They claim that adoption of the "quickening" distinction through received common law and state statutes tacitly recognizes the greater health hazards inherent in late abortion and impliedly repudiates the theory that life begins at conception.

    It is with these interests, and the weight to be attached to them, that this case is concerned.

    The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy.  In a line of decisions, however, going back perhaps as far as Union Pacific R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891), the court has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain  areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution.  In varying contexts, the Court or individual justices have, indeed, found at least the roots of that right in the first amendment...; in the fourth and fifth amendments...; in the penumbras of the bill of rights, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S., at 484-485; in the Ninth Amendment..., or in the concept of liberty guaranteed by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment...  These decisions make it clear that only  personal rights that can be deemed "fundamental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,"...are included in this guarantee of personal privacy.  They also make it clear that the right has some extension to activities relating to marriage..., contraception..., family relationships..., and child rearing and education....

    This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth  Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the district court determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.  The detriment that the state would impose upon the pregnant  woman by denying this choice altogether is apparent.  Specific and direct harm medically diagnosable even in early pregnancy may be involved.  Maternity, or additional off-spring, may force upon the woman a distressful life and future.  Psychological harm may be imminent.  Mental and physical health may be taxed by child care. There is also the distress, for all concerned, associated with the unwanted child, and there is the problem of bringing a child into a family already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it.  In other cases, as in this one, the additional difficulties and continuing stigma factors the woman and her responsible physician  necessarily will consider in consultation.

    On the basis of elements such as these, appellant and some amici argue that the woman's right is absolute and that she is entitled to terminate her pregnancy at whatever time, in whatever way, and for  whatever reason she alone chooses.  With this we do not agree.  Appellant's arguments that Texas either has no valid interest strong enough to support any limitation upon the woman's sole determination, are unpersuasive.  The Court's decisions recognizing a right of privacy also acknowledge that some state regulation in areas protected by that  right is appropriate.  As noted above, a state may properly assert  important interests in safeguarding health, in maintaining medical  standards, and in protecting potential life.  At some point in  pregnancy, these respective interests become sufficiently compelling to sustain regulation of the factors that govern the abortion decision.  The privacy right involved, therefore, cannot be said to be absolute.  In fact, it is not clear to us that the claim asserted by some amici that one has an unlimited right to do with one's  body as one pleases bears a close relationship to the right of privacy previously articulated in the Court's decisions.  The Court has refused to recognize an unlimited right of this kind in the past.  Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (vaccination); Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (sterilization).

    We, therefore, conclude that the right of personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but that this right is not unqualified and must be considered against important state interests in regulation.

    We note that those federal and state courts that have recently  considered abortion law challenges have reached the same conclusion... Although the results are divided, most of these courts have agreed that the right of privacy, however based, is broad enough to cover the abortion decision; that the right, nonetheless, is not absolute and is subject to some limitations; and that at some point the state interests as to protection of health, medical standards, and prenatal life,
become dominant.  We agree with this approach....

    Where certain "fundamental rights" are involved, the court has held  that regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a "compelling state interest,"...

    In the recent abortion cases, cited above, courts have recognized these principles.  Those striking down state laws have generally  scrutinized the state's interests in protecting health and potential  life, and have concluded that neither interest justified broad limitations on the reasons for which a physician and his pregnant  patient might decide that she should have an abortion in the early  stages of pregnancy.  Courts sustaining state laws have held that the state's determinations to protect health or prenatal life are dominant  and constitutionally justifiable.

    The District Court held that the appellee failed to meet his burden  of demonstrating that the Texas statute's infringement upon Roe's  rights was necessary to support a compelling state interest, and that, although the appellee presented "several compelling justifications for  state presence in the area of abortions," the statutes outstripped these justifications and swept "far beyond any areas of compelling state interest"...  Appellant and appellee both contest that holding.  Appellant, as has been indicated, claims an  absolute right that bars any state imposition of criminal penalties in  the area.  Appellee argues that the state's determination to recognize and protect prenatal life from and after conception constitutes a compelling state interest.  As noted above, we do not agree fully with
either formulation.

    A. The appellee and certain amici argue that the fetus is a "person"  within the language and meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.  In  support of this, they outline at length and in detail the well-known  facts of fetal development.  If this suggestion of personhood is  established, the appellant's case, of course, collapses, for the fetus' right to life would then be guaranteed specifically by the amendment.  The appellant conceded as much on reargument.  On the other hand, the appellee conceded on reargument  that no case could be cited  that holds that a fetus is a person within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment.

    The Constitution does not define "person" in so many words.  Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment contains three references to "person."  The first, in defining "citizens," speaks of "persons born or  naturalized in the United States."  The word also appears both in the Due Process Clause and in the Equal Protection Clause.  "Person" is used in other places in the Constitution:  in the listing of qualifications for representatives and senators, art. i, sec. 2, cl. 2, and sec. 3, cl. 3; in the Apportionment Clause, art. i, sec. 2, cl. 3;  in the Migration and Importation provision, art. i, sec. 9, cl. 1; in the Emolument Clause, art. i, sec. 9, cl. 8; in the Electors  provisions, art. ii, sec. 1 cl. 2, and the superseded cl. 3; in the provision outlining qualifications for the office of President, art. ii, sec. 1, cl. 5; in the Extradition provision, art. iv, sec. 2, cl. 2, and the superseded Fugitive Slave Clause 3; and in the Fifth, Twelfth, and Twenty-second Amendments, as well as in secs. 2 and 3 of  the Fourteenth Amendment.  But in nearly all these instances, the use of the word is such that it has application only postnatally.  None indicates, with any assurance, that it has any possible pre-natal application.

    All this, together with our observation, supra, that throughout the major portion of the 19th century prevailing legal abortion practices were far freer than they are today, persuades us that the word "person," as used in the fourteenth amendment, does not include the unborn.  This is in accord with the results reached in those few cases where the issue has been squarely presented...

    This conclusion, however, does not of itself fully answer the contentions raised by Texas, and we pass on to other considerations.

    B. The pregnant woman cannot be isolated in her privacy.  She carries an embryo and, later, a fetus, if one accepts the medical  definitions of the developing young in the human uterus...  The situation therefore is inherently different from marital intimacy, or  bedroom possession of obscene material, or marriage, or procreation, or education...  As we have intimated above, it is reasonable and appropriate for a state to decide that at some point in time another interest, that of health of the mother or that of potential human life, becomes significantly  involved.  The woman's privacy is no longer sole and any right of  privacy she possesses must be measured accordingly.

    Texas urges that, apart from the Fourteenth Amendment, life begins  at conception and is present throughout pregnancy, and that, therefore, the state has a compelling interest in protecting that life from and  after conception.  We need not resolve the difficult question of when  life begins.  When those trained in the respective disciplines of  medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at any  consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development of man's knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the answer.

    It should be sufficient to note briefly the wide divergence of  thinking on this most sensitive and difficult question.  There has always been strong support for the view that life does not begin until  live birth.  This was the belief of the Stoics.  It appears to be the predominant, though not the unanimous, attitude of the Jewish  faith.  It may be taken to represent also the position of a large segment of the protestant community, insofar as that can be  ascertained; organized groups that have taken a formal position on the  abortion issue have generally regarded abortion as a matter for the conscience of the individual and her family.  As we have noted,  the common law found greater significance in quickening.  Physicians  and their scientific colleagues have regarded that event with less  interest and have tended to focus either upon conception, upon live  birth, or upon the interim point at which the fetus becomes "viable,"  that is, potentially able to live outside the mother's womb, albeit  with artificial aid.  Viability is usually placed at about seven  months (28 weeks) but may occur earlier, even at 24 weeks.  The  Aristotelian theory of "mediate animation," that held sway throughout  the Middle Ages and the Renaissance in Europe, continued to be official  Roman Catholic dogma until the 19th century, despite opposition to this "ensoulment" theory from those in the church who would recognize the existence of life from the moment of conception.  The latter is now, of course, the official belief of the Catholic Church.  As one of the briefs amicus discloses, this is a view strongly held by many non  Catholics as well, and by many physicians.  Substantial problems for  precise definition of this view are posed, however, by new  embryological data that purport to indicate that conception is a "process" over time, rather than an event, and by new medical  techniques implantation of embryos, artificial insemination, and even  artificial wombs.

    In areas other than criminal abortion, the law has been reluctant to endorse any theory that life, as we recognize it, begins before live birth or to accord legal rights to the unborn except in narrowly defined situations and except when the rights are contingent upon live birth.  For example, the traditional rule of tort law denied recovery for prenatal injuries even though the child was born alive.  That  rule has been changed in almost every jurisdiction.  In most states, recovery is said to be permitted only if the fetus was viable, or at  least quick, when the injuries were sustained, though few courts have squarely so held.  In a recent development, generally opposed by  the commentators, some states permit the parents of a stillborn child to maintain an action for wrongful death because of prenatal injuries.  Such an action, however, would appear to be one to vindicate the parents' interest and is thus consistent with the view that the fetus,
at most, represents only the potentiality of life.  Similarly, unborn children have been recognized as acquiring rights or interests by way of inheritance or other devolution of property, and have been represented by guardians ad litem.  Perfection of the interests  involved, again, has generally been contingent upon live birth.  In  short, the unborn have never been recognized in the law as persons in  the whole sense.

    In view of all this, we do not agree that, by adopting one theory of  life, Texas may override the rights of the pregnant woman that are at  stake.  We repeat, however, that the state does have an important and legitimate interest in preserving and protecting the health of the  pregnant woman, whether she be a resident of the state or a nonresident who seeks medical consultation and treatment there, and that it has  still another important and legitimate interest in protecting the
potentiality of human life.  these interests are separate and distinct.  Each grows in substantiality as the woman approaches term and, at a point during pregnancy, each becomes "compelling."

    With respect to the state's important and legitimate interest in the health of the mother, the "compelling" point, in the light of present  medical knowledge, is at approximately the end of the first trimester.  This is so because of the now-established medical fact... that until the end of the first trimester mortality in
abortion may be less than mortality in normal childbirth.  It follows  that, from and after this point, a state may regulate the abortion  procedure to the extent that the regulation reasonably relates to the preservation and protection of maternal health.  Examples of  permissible state regulation in this area are requirements as to the  qualifications of the person who is to perform the abortion; as to the  licensure of that person; as to the facility in which the procedure is  to be performed, that is, whether it must be a hospital or may be a  clinic or some other place of less-than-hospital status; as to the  licensing of the facility; and the like.

    This means, on the other hand, that, for the period of pregnancy  prior to this "compelling" point, the attending physician, in  consultation with his patient, is free to determine, without regulation  by the state, that, in his medical judgment, the patient's pregnancy  should be terminated.  If that decision is reached, the judgment may be effectuated by an abortion free of interference by the state.

    With respect to the state's important and legitimate interest in  potential life, the "compelling" point is at viability.  This is so  because the fetus then presumably has the capability of meaningful life  outside the mother's womb.  State regulation protective of fetal life  after viability thus has both logical and biological justifications.  If the state is interested in protecting fetal life after viability, it  may go so far as to proscribe abortion during that period, except when  it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.  Measured against these standards, art. 1196 of the Texas penal code, in  restricting legal abortions to those "procured or attempted by medical  advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother,"  sweeps too  broadly.  The statute makes no distinction between abortions performed  early in pregnancy and those performed later, and it limits to a single  reason, "saving" the mother's life, the legal justification for the
procedure.  The statute, therefore, cannot survive the constitutional  attack made upon it here.
 

    To summarize and to repeat:

    1.  A state criminal abortion statute of the current texas type, that excepts from criminality only a lifesaving procedure on behalf of  the mother, without regard to pregnancy stage and without recognition  of the other interests involved, is violative of the due process clause  of the fourteenth amendment.

    (a) For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first  trimester, the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to  the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending physician.

    (b) For the stage subsequent to approximately the end of the first  trimester, the state, in promoting its interest in the health of the  mother, may, if it chooses, regulate the abortion procedure in ways  that are reasonably related to maternal health.

    (c) For the stage subsequent to viability, the state in promoting  its interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses,  regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in  appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or  health of the mother.

Here's Justice White's dissenting opinion in Doe v. Bolton and his criticism of what he considers an unjustified federal imposition on the States of a dubious constitutional right to abortion on demand prior to viability.  Notice his claim that the issue of abortion should be "left with the people and to the political processes the people have devised to govern their affairs."

Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973)

WHITE, J. -- dissenting
 

MR. JUSTICE WHITE, with whom MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST joins, dissenting.*

At the heart of the controversy in these cases are those recurring pregnancies that pose no danger whatsoever to the life or health of the mother but are, nevertheless, unwanted for any one or more of a variety of reasons -- convenience, family planning, economics, dislike of children, the embarrassment of illegitimacy, etc. The common claim before us is that, for any one of such reasons, or for no reason at all, and without asserting or claiming any threat to life or health, any woman is entitled to an abortion at her request if she is able to find a medical advisor willing to undertake the procedure.

The Court, for the most part, sustains this position: during the period prior to the time the fetus becomes viable, the Constitution of the United States values the convenience, whim, or caprice of the putative mother more than the life or potential life of the fetus; the Constitution, therefore, guarantees the right to an abortion as against any state law or policy seeking to protect the fetus from an abortion not prompted by more compelling reasons of the mother.

With all due respect, I dissent. I find nothing in the language or history of the Constitution to support the Court's judgment. The Court simply fashions and announces a new constitutional right for pregnant mothers [410 U.S. 222] and, with scarcely any reason or authority for its action, invests that right with sufficient substance to override most existing state abortion statutes. The upshot is that the people and the legislatures of the 50 States are constitutionally dissentitled to weigh the relative importance of the continued existence and development of the fetus, on the one hand, against a spectrum of possible impacts on the mother, on the other hand. As an exercise of raw judicial power, the Court perhaps has authority to do what it does today; but, in my view, its judgment is an improvident and extravagant exercise of the power of judicial review that the Constitution extends to this Court.

The Court apparently values the convenience of the pregnant mother more than the continued existence and development of the life or potential life that she carries. Whether or not I might agree with that marshaling of values, I can in no event join the Court's judgment because I find no constitutional warrant for imposing such an order of priorities on the people and legislatures of the States. In a sensitive area such as this, involving as it does issues over which reasonable men may easily and heatedly differ, I cannot accept the Court's exercise of its clear power of choice by interposing a constitutional barrier to state efforts to protect human life and by investing mothers and doctors with the constitutionally protected right to exterminate it. This issue, for the most part, should be left with the people and to the political processes the people have devised to govern their affairs.

It is my view, therefore, that the Texas statute is not constitutionally infirm because it denies abortions to those who seek to serve only their convenience, rather than to protect their life or health. Nor is this plaintiff, who claims no threat to her mental or physical health, entitled to assert the possible rights of those women [410 U.S. 223] whose pregnancy assertedly implicates their health. This, together with United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62 (1971), dictates reversal of the judgment of the District Court.

Likewise, because Georgia may constitutionally forbid abortions to putative mothers who, like the plaintiff in this case, do not fall within the reach of § 26-1202(a) of its criminal code, I have no occasion, and the District Court had none, to consider the constitutionality of the procedural requirements of the Georgia statute as applied to those pregnancies posing substantial hazards to either life or health. I would reverse the judgment of the District Court in the Georgia case.
 

* [This opinion applies also to No. 718, Roe v. Wade, ante p. 113.]