TheTeleological
Argument
The teleological argument is based on the notion of telos, the end for which something has a
certain structure. One must distinguish between
·
Order,
which is mere pattern, as in snowflakes
·
Design,
which is the use of order for some end,
as in the human eye, whose function is to allow us to see.
The argument aims at showing that design is an aspect of the
natural world. Traditionally, there are
two versions of the argument, physical, applied to some broad physical feature
of the world, and biological, applied to the design displayed by living
organisms.
The biological version
of the teleological argument
The biological version of the argument is quite old, occurring
already in Cicero’s De Natura Deorum. Its best version is in W. Paley’s Natural Theology (1802). He did not think that the argument from
design is best applied to cosmology, although the book does contain a chapter
on design in cosmology which is heavily influenced by Newton.
The basic intuitions behind the argument are
·
the
seemingly obvious fact that organs have functions in the economy of organisms
·
the
obvious fact that morphology and physiology are instrumental to the performance
of that function
So, the eye is made thus and so because of the function it
performs; in other words, it shows design.
The argument now considers the question of how an organ, e.g.,
the human eye, came about; to make things clear Paley uses an analogy with a
watch.
A. The watch analogy
Objections:
Reply: Ignorance of craftsmanship does not affect the
argument. Compare to the case of a lost art.
Reply: Less than optimal design is still design.
Reply: the argument still applies to the parts whose design
we understand.
Reply: a principle of order or a law aside from an
intelligent agent is nonsense, for they are nothing but “the modes according to
which an agent proceeds.”
B. The argument is cumulative: the eye shows design, and so does the
ear, etc.
C. Prospective Contrivances: In the growth of organisms, at times parts
are provided beforehand which are not used until later. This implies a
contemplation of the future (forethought), which presupposes intelligence.
Examples:
D. Omnipotence, omniscience, eternity, self-existence, and spirituality are compatible
with the nature of the designer, although not
derivable from the argument.
Problem: but the finiteness and
imperfection of creation point to a finite and imperfect god. Hence, atheistic teleological arguments are
possible.
E. The unity of God is proved by the uniformity of the plan of the universe,
as:
Note that this is a good piece of evidence, used by Darwin,
for evolution.
F. The goodness of God.
Objection:
teeth of predators?
Reply: predation balances superfluity.
Objection:
Pain?
Answer: the salutary role of pain.
Critique of the Teleological Argument
A . The argument is
useless (or at best of limited utility) with respect to orthodox theology
because:
B . Darwin's
theory of natural selection provides a better explanation of the design
living systems display, the principal focus of Paley's argument. Darwin
explicitly addresses the question: How could complex organs be the product of
evolution? Answer: They can be result of small modifications, each favorable,
through a very long period of time. Example, eye starting with nerves which are
light sensitive. This addresses the issue of irreducible complexity (the all or
nothing objection) advanced by Paley with respect to the eye.
NOTE: In his study of orchids (1862) D. also notes that their various
reproductive contrivances for attracting insects are formed out of pre-existing
material (typically petals).
In addition, at times
Note: these facts sit well with evolution
New versions of the argument from Behe have just added new
examples (flagella, clotting systems, etc.), for which many possible evolutionary
accounts have been proposed, without structurally changing the argument.
NOTE: Evolution cannot produce irreducible complexity by
accretion; however, evolution could explain cases of irreducible complexity by
the taking away of parts. Indeed natural
arches with keystones do occur even without evolution at work.
The cosmological version of the
Teleological Argument
This
is an old version of the argument that received new impetus with the scientific
revolution. For example, Newton adopted what might be called a teleological fine tuning argument, claiming that the facts that
show
design, because the likelihood of that happening by chance is very small. The telos
here is the existence of (intelligent) life.
However,
we now know that the solar system has been violently perturbed, that the young
Earth was bombarded by meteorites, and that life on Earth has undergone five
mass extinctions, all of which militates against intelligent design aimed at
producing, and presumably preserving, life.
A non-teleological Argument TO Design
Suppose
we drop the reference to the telos of
an organ or of the solar system and instead think in terms of the probability
of the world being as it is.
Newton
claimed that the facts that
provide
good evidence for the hand of God, as the chance of that coming about by mere
mechanical means is virtually nil.
However, apart from the fact that Newton got his “facts” rather wrong,
today we believe that the solar
system resulted from the gravitational collapse of a rotating cloud of
interstellar dust and gas, resulting in the sun and the planets; this weakens
Newton’s argument.
Along
analogous lines, we can think about the
probability of the existence of a world with intelligent life in it instead of
one without it. In physics there are
several (form 5 or 6 to 26, depending on whom one asks) independent dimensionless physical constants, such as the charge of
the electron and Plank’s constant.
Here’s the basic argument:
NOTE:
There’s disagreement as to how many independent
dimensionless physical constants there are.
As we need to deal with dark matter or other newly discovered forms of
matter, the number of such constants will likely increase. Historically, there
is an oscillatory process in the number of constants: new experimental
discoveries compel the postulation of new ones, and theoretical advances
diminish them. For example, the constants of chemistry are now theoretically
reducible to those of quantum mechanics. Presumably, if we find a new theory
underlying both general relativity and quantum mechanics, the number of
constants will go down, although nobody knows for sure.
Problems: