Locke's political theory
Lk's views are mainly contained in his Two Treatises on Civil Government.
The first of these attacks Robert Filmer's view that the king is the
divinely ordained father of the people, with a line of authority going
back to Adam, who had absolute power over Eve, their children and the whole
world. Lk argues that:
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Adam never had absolute power over Eve or their children. In particular,
once one reached the age of discretion, i.e., the capacity to reason,
one's subordination to one's parents ceases (cf. Second Treatise,
59).
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Parental authority is different in nature from political authority because
a parent has the former even in society, which couldn't be if all authority
were in the sovereign (cf. Second Treatise, 71)
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No line of transmission of authority could be established between Adam
and any king, (e.g. Charles II).
The Second Treatise, by contrast, proposes Lk's own views on the
nature of political society, and it's our topic here.
1.
Lk's account starts with the description of the state of nature, i.e.,
the state in which people find themselves when there's no common judge
with the authority to settle their disputes (19).
NOTE: The state of nature is the result of a thought experiment and
it has two aspects:
-
a normative aspect: how should these people behave with respect
to each other?
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a factual aspect: how would they in fact behave?
The state of nature is not a state of license because we are bound
by the Law of Nature (compare with Hb). One is free, without asking
permission to anyone else, to pursue any course of action within the
bounds of the Law of Nature , i.e., Reason (14).
Problems:
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Can Lk square his appeal to reason and the Law of Nature (e.g., "murderers
should be killed") as being written in our heart (11) with the denial
of innate ideas/principles?
Reply: the Law of Nature is written in our hearts only in the
sense that we can know it by natural means.
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For Locke, a law is a command issues by a person in authority who has also
attached sanctions to it. But we don't know by natural reason that
there's an afterlife in which God administers such sanctions.
NOTE: The Law of Nature is a moral law, and as such doesn't per se
confer rights on its beneficiaries. For example: I may have a moral
duty to be kind to strangers, but one needn't hold that strangers have
a right to be tretaed kindly by me. Similarly, I may have a moral
duty not to mistreat animals, but one needn't hold that animals have intrinsic
rights.
2.
The Law of Nature teaches us, among other things, e.g., that parents
have a duty to "preserve, nourish and educate their children (56) that
we have a right:
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to preserve ourselves and our property
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to preserve the life, health, liberty and possessions of others (4,6).
This:
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entails a right to punish offenders to the extent necessary to achieve
special and general deterrence (12).
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is compatible with a right to appropriate, by work, as much of the natural
world as we can keep without spoilage and without unduly diminish other
people's access to the same abundance (27, 31)
NOTE: at times, , e.g., at 123, Lk uses "property" to signify
life, health, liberty and possessions.
Although men differ in intelligence, capacities, birth, etc. (54), they
have all been equally given the Earth for their use (by God) and have the
same faculties; consequently, the state of nature is a state of equality
(4).
NOTES:
-
Hence, the equality in the state of nature has a theological dimension
(compare with Hb).
-
Independent states are in a state of nature, as are sovereigns and foreigners.
Their relations are ruled by the Law of Nature (14) (compare to Hb).
3.
Since the Law of Nature doesn't by itself give us rights, where do
they come from? One reading is to say that they come from God.
We are God's property, and made to last to God's pleasure (6) God
owns us (he's the freeholder) and we have rights only as leaseholders,
as it were. In other words, our rights are parasitic on God's.
NOTES:
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Hence, nobody can commit suicide or enslave oneself by compact because
one cannot give away (one's life and the right on it) what one doesn't
own in the first place (23)
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Some of Locke's rights are inalienable in the sense that they cannot be
voluntarily renounced (e.g., life and liberty), but only because they are
parasitic on God's; some are alienable, e.g., the right to property and
the right to punish.
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Locke's rights are
claim-rights (vs. liberty-rights: I have a right to go for the wallet
on the pavement, but you don't have any obligation not to interfere), that
is they restrict others' behavior.
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active rights (vs. rights of recipience), that is, they correlate with
duties of non-interference.
4.
Locke's theory of property opposes both Hobbes and Filmer on the one
hand, and Pufendorf's on the other. Both Hobbes and Filmer (in different
ways) held that the sovereign is the source of the right to property; Pufendoerf
held that in the state of nature private use of good requires other people's
consent.
Although God has given the Earth to all men in common, private
property can be justified without appeal to any political compact (that
is, private property is logically prior to political society). Locke
gives two arguments:
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Seeping argument
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Each man, and nobody else, has a right to his own person and to the labor
of his body (27).
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Hence, whatsoever in nature one mixes his own labor (or another's labor
one has bought) with, it becomes his
Problem: Why should my ownership permeate the object I worked
upon?
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Desert argument
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By mixing my labor with an object, I increase its value (40)
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Hence, I'm entitled to the object whose value I have augmented with my
labor.
Problem: Does all work increase the value of an object?
Problem: why not say that I'm entitled only to the surplus value
I have created?
NOTES:
Both argument can be strengthened by noting that since God gave us
the Earth so that we benefit from it, he clearly meant that we use it industriously
and rationally (34).
There are some restrictions placed on the acquisition of property.
I have a right to whatsoever in nature I mix my labor with provided
that
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"enough and as good" is left for others (27)
NOTE: this requirement is presumably based on the fact that God gave
the Earth to all of us to enjoy
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one can use it. So, nobody may appropriate
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more perishable goods than one can use before they spoil (31)
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more land than one can work (32)
NOTE: requirement is presumably based on the fact that nature belongs to
God and was 'leased' to us to enjoy (you can't enjoy what's spoiled)
However, in order to facilitate transactions, men agree to introduce
money. But since money doesn't spoil, one can hoard it and in effect
circumvent the no-spoilage requirement (46-50). So, one may own more
land or goods than one can use.
NOTE: as for the requirement that enough be left for others, Lk thinks
that
much land is still wild and waiting to be used by us (45)
the hoarding of property by the industrious increases the amount of
goods available and consequently benefits all humankind (37).
Although the right to property logically precedes political society,
the latter can regulate the right of property (50). So, we now turn to
the constitution of political society.
5.
If A has an unjustified "sedate and settled" design (not merely a hasty
one) on B's freedom (and hence B's life), A is in a state of war with B,
who therefore has a right to retaliate (16). In particular, if A's
act deserves death, or B vanquishes A in a "just war", then B has the right
to enslave A. However, A can end his state by opposing the will of the
master and hence being killed (23-4; 85; 172)
NOTE: A may be in a state of war with B even in a political society
(19)
The state of nature is not, per se, a state of war (19).
However, the former leads to the latter because men, moved by passion (e.g.,
covetousness and greed) and misjudgment, not only disagree on the
content and application the Law of Nature, but often lack the power to
apply it (13, 20; 124-26). Hence, to preserve their lives, liberties
and possessions, people enter a social contract with each other
by
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giving up the power to do what one thinks the Law of Nature allows to preserve
one's own and other people's lives, liberty and possessions so that society
may regulate it (128-29)
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wholly transferring the power of punishing to the state (89; 129).
Those who don't enter political society remain in the state of nature with
respect to the state (95).
Once the people have compacted with each other, they (i.e., the majority
unless otherwise specified) set up a government by entrusting it
to pursue the good of the people (134, 149).
NOTES: So:
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The institution of political society is the result of a pact of association,
not a pact of submission (compare to Hb)
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the people are both the trustor and the beneficiary of the trust,
while the government are the trustees who act for the good of the
people (compare to Hb).
At this juncture, Lk considers two possible objections:
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There's no historical evidence of a group of equal people in the state
of nature forming political society through a compact (100)
Answer: the scarcity of historical record is due to lack
of commodities in the state of nature and to temporal distance; however,
there are recorded instances, e.g., the founding of Rome or Venice (101-2).
Moreover, a "Swiss and an Indian in the woods of America" are, with respect
to each other, in the state of nature (14). So, even if some society
may develop from a family, it still requires the consent of the governed
(110-112).
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Since everyone is born under some government, nobody is rightfully free
to form a new one by compact (113).
Answer: it's true that who has given express consent to a state
may
not exit it rightfully (121). However, a child is born subject
of no state; upon reaching the age of discretion, if he chooses to stay
gives a tacit consent amounting to a subjection to the state (119).
But who gives merely tacit consent may rightfully exit the
compact and form a new state in vacuis locis.
NOTE:
Political society is different in nature from mere society, which arises
from conjugal compact between man and wife and develops into a compact
between master and servant (78-86)
6.
Basically, Locke provides three arguments against absolutism:
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Nobody has abolute power over one's life or anyone else's life (we belong
to God). Hence no such power can be trnsferred to an absolute ruler
(135)
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Absolute monarchy, in which one person is the final arbiter of all controversies
and consequently effectively remains in the state of nature, is incompatible
with the ends of civil society, for no protection from the "violence and
oppression" of such a ruler could be found (90, 93).
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Absolutism is worse than the state of nature (93)
So, since the end of society is the preservation the citizens' lives, liberties
and possessions, the power of the state is never supposed to extend beyond
what's required to preserve them (131)
NOTE: here the disagreement witjh Hobbes is very sharp: for Hobbes
only absolutism is stable
A constitutional monarchy with a separation of the legislative from
the executive (in the hands of the monarch) is the form of government Lk
preferred (159). But ultimately, sovereignty remains in the hands
of the people, who have a right to rebel when they decide
that the rulers have breached the trust which keeps them rightfully
in power (140)