Chapter X
 
Of our Knowledge of the Existence of a God

  1. We are capable of knowing certainly that there is a God. Though
God has given us no innate ideas of himself; though he has stamped
no original characters on our minds, wherein we may read his being;
yet having furnished us with those faculties our minds are endowed
with, he hath not left himself without witness: since we have sense,
perception, and reason, and cannot want a clear proof of him, as
long as we carry ourselves about us. Nor can we justly complain of our
ignorance in this great point; since he has so plentifully provided us
with the means to discover and know him; so far as is necessary to the
end of our being, and the great concernment of our happiness. But,
though this be the most obvious truth that reason discovers, and
though its evidence be (if I mistake not) equal to mathematical
certainty: yet it requires thought and attention; and the mind must
apply itself to a regular deduction of it from some part of our
intuitive knowledge, or else we shall be as uncertain and ignorant
of this as of other propositions, which are in themselves capable of
clear demonstration. To show, therefore, that we are capable of
knowing, i.e. being certain that there is a God, and how we may come
by this certainty, I think we need go no further than ourselves, and
that undoubted knowledge we have of our own existence.
  2. For man knows that he himself exists. I think it is beyond
question, that man has a clear idea of his own being; he knows
certainly he exists, and that he is something. He that can doubt
whether he be anything or no, I speak not to; no more than I would
argue with pure nothing, or endeavour to convince nonentity that it
were something. If any one pretends to be so sceptical as to deny
his own existence, (for really to doubt of it is manifestly
impossible,) let him for me enjoy his beloved happiness of being
nothing, until hunger or some other pain convince him of the contrary.
This, then, I think I may take for a truth, which every one's
certain knowledge assures him of, beyond the liberty of doubting, viz.
that he is something that actually exists.
  3 He knows also that nothing cannot produce a being; therefore
something must have existed from eternity. In the next place, man
knows, by an intuitive certainty, that bare nothing can no more
produce any real being, than it can be equal to two right angles. If a
man knows not that nonentity, or the absence of all being, cannot be
equal to two right angles, it is impossible he should know any
demonstration in Euclid. If, therefore, we know there is some real
being, and that nonentity cannot produce any real being, it is an
evident demonstration, that from eternity there has been something;
since what was not from eternity had a beginning; and what had a
beginning must be produced by something else.
  4. And that eternal Being must be most powerful. Next, it is
evident, that what had its being and beginning from another, must also
have all that which is in and belongs to its being from another too.
All the powers it has must be owing to and received from the same
source. This eternal source, then, of all being must also be the
source and original of all power; and so this eternal Being must be
also the most powerful.
  5. And most knowing. Again, a man finds in himself perception and
knowledge. We have then got one step further; and we are certain now
that there is not only some being, but some knowing, intelligent being
in the world. There was a time, then, when there was no knowing being,
and when knowledge began to be; or else there has been also a
knowing being from eternity. If it be said, there was a time when no
being had any knowledge, when that eternal being was void of all
understanding; I reply, that then it was impossible there should
ever have been any knowledge: it being as impossible that things
wholly void of knowledge, and operating blindly, and without any
perception, should produce a knowing being, as it is impossible that a
triangle should make itself three angles bigger than two right ones.
For it is as repugnant to the idea of senseless matter, that it should
put into itself sense, perception, and knowledge, as it is repugnant
to the idea of a triangle, that it should put into itself greater
angles than two right ones.
  6. And therefore God. Thus, from the consideration of ourselves, and
what we infallibly find in our own constitutions, our reason leads
us to the knowledge of this certain and evident truth,- That there
is an eternal, most powerful, and most knowing Being; which whether
any one will please to call God, it matters not. The thing is evident;
and from this idea duly considered, will easily be deduced all those
other attributes, which we ought to ascribe to this eternal Being. If,
nevertheless, any one should be found so senselessly arrogant, as to
suppose man alone knowing and wise, but yet the product of mere
ignorance and chance; and that all the rest of the universe acted only
by that blind haphazard; I shall leave with him that very rational and
emphatical rebuke of Tully (I. ii. De Leg.), to be considered at his
leisure: "What can be more sillily arrogant and misbecoming, than
for a man to think that he has a mind and understanding in him, but
yet in all the universe beside there is no such thing? Or that those
things, which with the utmost stretch of his reason he can scarce
comprehend, should be moved and managed without any reason at all?"
Quid est enim verius, quam neminem esse oportere tam stulte
arrogantem, ut in se mentem et rationem putet inesse, in caelo
mundoque non putet? Aut ea quae vix summa ingenii ratione
comprehendat, nulla ratione moveri putet?
  From what has been said, it is plain to me we have a more certain
knowledge of the existence of a God, than of anything our senses
have not immediately discovered to us. Nay, I presume I may say,
that we more certainly know that there is a God, than that there is
anything else without us. When I say we know, I mean there is such a
knowledge within our reach which we cannot miss, if we will but
apply our minds to that, as we do to several other inquiries.
  7. Our idea of a most perfect Being, not the sole proof of a God.
How far the idea of a most perfect being, which a man may frame in his
mind, does or does not prove the existence of a God, I will not here
examine. For in the different make of men's tempers and application of
their thoughts, some arguments prevail more on one, and some on
another, for the confirmation of the same truth. But yet, I think,
this I may say, that it is an ill way of establishing this truth,
and silencing atheists, to lay the whole stress of so important a
point as this upon that sole foundation: and take some men's having
that idea of God in their minds, (for it is evident some men have
none, and some worse than none, and the most very different,) for
the only proof of a Deity; and out of an over fondness of that darling
invention, cashier, or at least endeavour to invalidate all other
arguments; and forbid us to hearken to those proofs, as being weak
or fallacious, which our own existence, and the sensible parts of
the universe offer so clearly and cogently to our thoughts, that I
deem it impossible for a considering man to withstand them. For I
judge it as certain and clear a truth as can anywhere be delivered,
that "the invisible things of God are clearly seen from the creation
of the world, being understood by the things that are made, even his
eternal power and Godhead." Though our own being furnishes us, as I
have shown, with an evident and incontestable proof of a Deity; and
I believe nobody can avoid the cogency of it, who will but as
carefully attend to it, as to any other demonstration of so many
parts: yet this being so fundamental a truth, and of that consequence,
that all religion and genuine morality depend thereon, I doubt not but
I shall be forgiven by my reader if I go over some parts of this
argument again, and enlarge a little more upon them.
  8. Recapitulation- something from eternity. There is no truth more
evident than that something must be from eternity. I never yet heard
of any one so unreasonable, or that could suppose so manifest a
contradiction, as a time wherein there was perfectly nothing. This
being of all absurdities the greatest, to imagine that pure nothing,
the perfect negation and absence of all beings, should ever produce
any real existence.
  It being, then, unavoidable for all rational creatures to
conclude, that something has existed from eternity; let us next see
what kind of thing that must be.
  9. Two sorts of beings, cogitative and incogitative. There are but
two sorts of beings in the world that man knows or conceives.
  First, such as are purely material, without sense, perception, or
thought, as the clippings of our beards, and parings of our nails.
  Secondly, sensible, thinking, perceiving beings, such as we find
ourselves to be. Which, if you please, we will hereafter call
cogitative and incogitative beings; which to our present purpose, if
for nothing else, are perhaps better terms than material and
immaterial.
  10. Incogitative being cannot produce a cogitative being. If,
then, there must be something eternal, let us see what sort of being
it must be. And to that it is very obvious to reason, that it must
necessarily be a cogitative being. For it is as impossible to conceive
that ever bare incogitative matter should produce a thinking
intelligent being, as that nothing should of itself produce matter.
Let us suppose any parcel of matter eternal, great or small, we
shall find it, in itself, able to produce nothing. For example: let us
suppose the matter of the next pebble we meet with eternal, closely
united, and the parts firmly at rest together; if there were no
other being in the world, must it not eternally remain so, a dead
inactive lump? Is it possible to conceive it can add motion to itself,
being purely matter, or produce anything? Matter, then, by its own
strength, cannot produce in itself so much as motion: the motion it
has must also be from eternity, or else be produced, and added to
matter by some other being more powerful than matter; matter, as is
evident, having not power to produce motion in itself. But let us
suppose motion eternal too: yet matter, incogitative matter and
motion, whatever changes it might produce of figure and bulk, could
never produce thought: knowledge will still be as far beyond the power
of motion and matter to produce, as matter is beyond the power of
nothing or nonentity to produce. And I appeal to every one's own
thoughts, whether he cannot as easily conceive matter produced by
nothing, as thought to be produced by pure matter, when, before, there
was no such thing as thought or an intelligent being existing?
Divide matter into as many parts as you will, (which we are apt to
imagine a sort of spiritualizing, or making a thinking thing of it,)
vary the figure and motion of it as much as you please- a globe, cube,
cone, prism, cylinder, &c., whose diameters are but 100,000th part
of a gry, will operate no otherwise upon other bodies of
proportionable bulk, than those of an inch or foot diameter; and you
may as rationally expect to produce sense, thought, and knowledge,
by putting together, in a certain figure and motion, gross particles
of matter, as by those that are the very minutest that do anywhere
exist. They knock, impel, and resist one another, just as the
greater do; and that is all they can do. So that, if we will suppose
nothing first or eternal, matter can never begin to be: if we
suppose bare matter without motion, eternal, motion can never begin to
be: if we suppose only matter and motion first, or eternal, thought
can never begin to be. For it is impossible to conceive that matter,
either with or without motion, could have, originally, in and from
itself, sense, perception, and knowledge; as is evident from hence,
that then sense, perception, and knowledge, must be a property
eternally inseparable from matter and every particle of it. Not to
add, that, though our general or specific conception of matter makes
us speak of it as one thing, yet really all matter is not one
individual thing, neither is there any such thing existing as one
material being, or one single body that we know or can conceive. And
therefore, if matter were the eternal first cogitative being, there
would not be one eternal, infinite, cogitative being, but an
infinite number of eternal, finite, cogitative beings, independent one
of another, of limited force, and distinct thoughts, which could never
produce that order, harmony, and beauty which are to be found in
nature. Since, therefore, whatsoever is the first eternal being must
necessarily be cogitative; and whatsoever is first of all things
must necessarily contain in it, and actually have, at least, all the
perfections that can ever after exist; nor can it ever give to another
any perfection that it hath not either actually in itself, or, at
least, in a higher degree; it necessarily follows, that the first
eternal being cannot be matter.
  11. Therefore, there has been an eternal cogitative Being. If,
therefore, it be evident, that something necessarily must exist from
eternity, it is also as evident, that that something must
necessarily be a cogitative being: for it is as impossible that
incogitative matter should produce a cogitative being, as that
nothing, or the negation of all being, should produce a positive being
or matter.
 

Chapter XVIII
 
Of Faith and Reason, and their Distinct Provinces
....
2. Faith and reason, what, as contradistinguished. I find every
sect, as far as reason will help them, make use of it gladly: and
where it fails them, they cry out, It is matter of faith, and above
reason. And I do not see how they can argue with any one, or ever
convince a gainsayer who makes use of the same plea, without setting
down strict boundaries between faith and reason; which ought to be the
first point established in all questions where faith has anything to
do.
  Reason, therefore, here, as contradistinguished to faith, I take
to be the discovery of the certainty or probability of such
propositions or truths which the mind arrives at by deduction made
from such ideas, which it has got by the use of its natural faculties;
viz. by sensation or reflection.
  Faith, on the other side, is the assent to any proposition, not thus
made out by the deductions of reason, but upon the credit of the
proposer, as coming from God, in some extraordinary way of
communication. This way of discovering truths to men, we call
revelation.
  3. No new simple idea can be conveyed by traditional revelation.
First, Then I say, that no man inspired by God can by any revelation
communicate to others any new simple ideas which they had not before
from sensation or reflection. For, whatsoever impressions he himself
may have from the immediate hand of God, this revelation, if it be
of new simple ideas, cannot be conveyed to another, either by words or
any other signs. Because words, by their immediate operation on us,
cause no other ideas but of their natural sounds: and it is by the
custom of using them for signs, that they excite and revive in our
minds latent ideas; but yet only such ideas as were there before.
For words, seen or heard, recall to our thoughts those ideas only
which to us they have been wont to be signs of, but cannot introduce
any perfectly new and formerly unknown simple ideas. The same holds in
all other signs; which cannot signify to us things of which we have
before never had any idea at all.
  Thus whatever things were discovered to St. Paul, when he was rapt
up into the third heaven; whatever new ideas his mind there
received, all the description he can make to others of that place,
is only this, That there are such things, "as eye hath not seen, nor
ear heard, nor hath it entered into the heart of man to conceive." And
supposing God should discover to any one, supernaturally, a species of
creatures inhabiting, for example, Jupiter or Saturn, (for that it
is possible there may be such, nobody can deny,) which had six senses;
and imprint on his mind the ideas conveyed to theirs by that sixth
sense: he could no more, by words, produce in the minds of other men
those ideas imprinted by that sixth sense, than one of us could convey
the idea of any colour, by the sound of words, into a man who,
having the other four senses perfect, had always totally wanted the
fifth, of seeing. For our simple ideas, then, which are the
foundation, and sole matter of all our notions and knowledge, we
must depend wholly on our reason; I mean our natural faculties; and
can by no means receive them, or any of them, from traditional
revelation. I say, traditional revelation, in distinction to
original revelation. By the one, I mean that first impression which is
made immediately by God on the mind of any man, to which we cannot set
any bounds; and by the other, those impressions delivered over to
others in words, and the ordinary ways of conveying our conceptions
one to another.
  4. Traditional revelation may make us know propositions knowable
also by reason, but not with the same certainty that reason doth.
Secondly, I say that the same truths may be discovered, and conveyed
down from revelation, which are discoverable to us by reason, and by
those ideas we naturally may have. So God might, by revelation,
discover the truth of any proposition in Euclid; as well as men, by
the natural use of their faculties, come to make the discovery
themselves. In all things of this kind there is little need or use
of revelation, God having furnished us with natural and surer means to
arrive at the knowledge of them. For whatsoever truth we come to the
clear discovery of, from the knowledge and contemplation of our own
ideas, will always be certainer to us than those which are conveyed to
us by traditional revelation. For the knowledge we have that this
revelation came at first from God can never be so sure as the
knowledge we have from the clear and distinct perception of the
agreement or disagreement of our own ideas: v.g. if it were revealed
some ages since, that the three angles of a triangle were equal to two
right ones, I might assent to the truth of that proposition, upon
the credit of that tradition, that it was revealed: but that would
never amount to so great a certainty as the knowledge of it, upon
the comparing and measuring my own ideas of two right angles, and
the three angles of a triangle. The like holds in matter of fact
knowable by our senses; v.g. the history of the deluge is conveyed
to us by writings which had their original from revelation: and yet
nobody, I think, will say he has as certain and clear a knowledge of
the flood as Noah, that saw it; or that he himself would have had, had
he then been alive and seen it. For he has no greater an assurance
than that of his senses, that it is writ in the book supposed writ
by Moses inspired: but he has not so great an assurance that Moses
wrote that book as if he had seen Moses write it. So that the
assurance of its being a revelation is less still than the assurance
of his senses.
  5. Even original revelation cannot be admitted against the clear
evidence of reason. In propositions, then, whose certainty is built
upon the clear perception of the agreement or disagreement of our
ideas, attained either by immediate intuition, as in self-evident
propositions, or by evident deductions of reason in demonstrations
we need not the assistance of revelation, as necessary to gain our
assent, and introduce them into our minds. Because the natural ways of
knowledge could settle them there, or had done it already; which is
the greatest assurance we can possibly have of anything, unless
where God immediately reveals it to us: and there too our assurance
can be no greater than our knowledge is, that it is a revelation
from God. But yet nothing, I think, can, under that title, shake or
overrule plain knowledge; or rationally prevail with any man to
admit it for true, in a direct contradiction to the clear evidence
of his own understanding. For, since no evidence of our faculties,
by which we receive such revelations, can exceed, if equal, the
certainty of our intuitive knowledge, we can never receive for a truth
anything that is directly contrary to our clear and distinct
knowledge; v.g. the ideas of one body and one place do so clearly
agree, and the mind has so evident a perception of their agreement,
that we can never assent to a proposition that affirms the same body
to be in two distant places at once, however it should pretend to
the authority of a divine revelation: since the evidence, first,
that we deceive not ourselves, in ascribing it to God; secondly,
that we understand it right; can never be so great as the evidence
of our own intuitive knowledge, whereby we discern it impossible for
the same body to be in two places at once. And therefore no
proposition can be received for divine revelation, or obtain the
assent due to all such, if it be contradictory to our clear
intuitive knowledge. Because this would be to subvert the principles
and foundations of all knowledge, evidence, and assent whatsoever: and
there would be left no difference between truth and falsehood, no
measures of credible and incredible in the world, if doubtful
propositions shall take place before self-evident; and what we
certainly know give way to what we may possibly be mistaken in. In
propositions therefore contrary to the clear perception of the
agreement or disagreement of any of our ideas, it will be in vain to
urge them as matters of faith. They cannot move our assent under
that or any other title whatsoever. For faith can never convince us of
anything that contradicts our knowledge. Because, though faith be
founded on the testimony of God (who cannot lie) revealing any
proposition to us: yet we cannot have an assurance of the truth of its
being a divine revelation greater than our own knowledge. Since the
whole strength of the certainty depends upon our knowledge that God
revealed it; which, in this case, where the proposition supposed
revealed contradicts our knowledge or reason, will always have this
objection hanging to it, viz. that we cannot tell how to conceive that
to come from God, the bountiful Author of our being, which, if
received for true, must overturn all the principles and foundations of
knowledge he has given us; render all our faculties useless; wholly
destroy the most excellent part of his workmanship, our
understandings; and put a man in a condition wherein he will have less
light, less conduct than the beast that perisheth. For if the mind
of man can never have a clearer (and perhaps not so clear) evidence of
anything to be a divine revelation, as it has of the principles of its
own reason, it can never have a ground to quit the clear evidence of
its reason, to give a place to a proposition, whose revelation has not
a greater evidence than those principles have.
  6. Traditional revelation much less. Thus far a man has use of
reason, and ought to hearken to it, even in immediate and original
revelation, where it is supposed to be made to himself. But to all
those who pretend not to immediate revelation, but are required to pay
obedience, and to receive the truths revealed to others, which, by the
tradition of writings, or word of mouth, are conveyed down to them,
reason has a great deal more to do, and is that only which can
induce us to receive them. For matter of faith being only divine
revelation, and nothing else, faith, as we use the word, (called
commonly divine faith), has to do with no propositions, but those
which are supposed to be divinely revealed. So that I do not see how
those who make revelation alone the sole object of faith can say
that it is a matter of faith, and not of reason, to believe that
such or such a proposition, to be found in such or such a book, is
of divine inspiration; unless it be revealed that that proposition, or
all in that book, was communicated by divine inspiration. Without such
a revelation, the believing, or not believing, that proposition, or
book, to be of divine authority, can never be matter of faith, but
matter of reason; and such as I must come to an assent to only by
the use of my reason, which can never require or enable me to
believe that which is contrary to itself: it being impossible for
reason ever to procure any assent to that which to itself appears
unreasonable.
  In all things, therefore, where we have clear evidence from our
ideas, and those principles of knowledge I have above mentioned,
reason is the proper judge; and revelation, though it may, in
consenting with it, confirm its dictates, yet cannot in such cases
invalidate its decrees: nor can we be obliged, where we have the clear
and evident sentience of reason, to quit it for the contrary
opinion, under a pretence that it is matter of faith: which can have
no authority against the plain and clear dictates of reason.
  7. Things above reason are, when revealed, the proper matter of
faith. But, Thirdly, There being many things wherein we have very
imperfect notions, or none at all; and other things, of whose past,
present, or future existence, by the natural use of our faculties,
we can have no knowledge at all; these, as being beyond the
discovery of our natural faculties, and above reason, are, when
revealed, the proper matter of faith. Thus, that part of the angels
rebelled against God, and thereby lost their first happy state: and
that the dead shall rise, and live again: these and the like, being
beyond the discovery of reason, are purely matters of faith, with
which reason has directly nothing to do.
  8. Or not contrary to reason, if revealed, are matter of faith;
and must carry it against probable conjectures of reason. But since
God, in giving us the light of reason, has not thereby tied up his own
hands from affording us, when he thinks fit, the light of revelation
in any of those matters wherein our natural faculties are able to give
a probable determination; revelation, where God has been pleased to
give it, must carry it against the probable conjectures of reason.
Because the mind not being certain of the truth of that it does not
evidently know, but only yielding to the probability that appears in
it, is bound to give up its assent to such a testimony which, it is
satisfied, comes from one who cannot err, and will not deceive. But
yet, it still belongs to reason to judge of the truth of its being a
revelation, and of the signification of the words wherein it is
delivered. Indeed, if anything shall be thought revelation which is
contrary to the plain principles of reason, and the evident
knowledge the mind has of its own clear and distinct ideas; there
reason must be hearkened to, as to a matter within its province. Since
a man can never have so certain a knowledge that a proposition which
contradicts the clear principles and evidence of his own knowledge was
divinely revealed, or that he understands the words rightly wherein it
is delivered, as he has that the contrary is true, and so is bound
to consider and judge of it as a matter of reason, and not swallow it,
without examination, as a matter of faith.
  9. Revelation in matters where reason cannot judge, or but probably,
ought to be hearkened to. First, Whatever proposition is revealed,
of whose truth our mind, by its natural faculties and notions,
cannot judge, that is purely matter of faith, and above reason.
  Secondly, All propositions whereof the mind, by the use of its
natural faculties, can come to determine and judge, from naturally
acquired ideas, are matter of reason; with this difference still,
that, in those concerning which it has but an uncertain evidence,
and so is persuaded of their truth only upon probable grounds, which
still admit a possibility of the contrary to be true, without doing
violence to the certain evidence of its own knowledge, and overturning
the principles of all reason; in such probable propositions, I say, an
evident revelation ought to determine our assent, even against
probability. For where the principles of reason have not evidenced a
proposition to be certainly true or false, there clear revelation,
as another principle of truth and ground of assent, may determine; and
so it may be matter of faith, and be also above reason. Because
reason, in that particular matter, being able to reach no higher
than probability, faith gave the determination where reason came
short; and revelation discovered on which side the truth lay.
  10. In matters where reason can afford certain knowledge, that is to
be hearkened to. Thus far the dominion of faith reaches, and that
without any violence or hindrance to reason; which is not injured or
disturbed, but assisted and improved by new discoveries of truth,
coming from the eternal fountain of all knowledge. Whatever God hath
revealed is certainly true: no doubt can be made of it. This is the
proper object of faith: but whether it be a divine revelation or no,
reason must judge; which can never permit the mind to reject a greater
evidence to embrace what is less evident, nor allow it to entertain
probability in opposition to knowledge and certainty. There can be
no evidence that any traditional revelation is of divine original,
in the words we receive it, and in the sense we understand it, so
clear and so certain as that of the principles of reason: and
therefore Nothing that is contrary to, and inconsistent with, the
clear and self-evident dictates of reason, has a right to he urged
or assented to as a matter of faith, wherein reason hath nothing to
do. Whatsoever is divine revelation, ought to overrule all our
opinions, prejudices, and interest, and hath a right to be received
with full assent. Such a submission as this, of our reason to faith,
takes not away the landmarks of knowledge: this shakes not the
foundations of reason, but leaves us that use of our faculties for
which they were given us.
  11. If the boundaries be not set between faith and reason, no
enthusiasm or extravagancy in religion can be contradicted. If the
provinces of faith and reason are not kept distinct by these
boundaries, there will, in matters of religion, be no room for
reason at all; and those extravagant opinions and ceremonies that
are to be found in the several religions of the world will not deserve
to be blamed. For, to this crying up of faith in opposition to reason,
we may, I think, in good measure ascribe those absurdities that fill
almost all the religions which possess and divide mankind. For men
having been principled with an opinion that they must not consult
reason in the things of religion, however apparently contradictory
to common sense and the very principles of all their knowledge, have
let loose their fancies and natural superstition; and have been by
them led into so strange opinions, and extravagant practices in
religion, that a considerate man cannot but stand amazed at their
follies, and judge them so far from being acceptable to the great
and wise God, that he cannot avoid thinking them ridiculous and
offensive to a sober good man. So that, in effect, religion, which
should most distinguish us from beasts, and ought most peculiarly to
elevate us, as rational creatures, above brutes, is that wherein men
often appear most irrational, and more senseless than beasts
themselves. Credo, quia impossibile est: I believe, because it is
impossible, might, in a good man, pass for a sally of zeal; but
would prove a very ill rule for men to choose their opinions or
religion by.
                             Chapter XIX
                            Of Enthusiasm

  1. Love of truth necessary. He that would seriously set upon the
search of truth ought in the first place to prepare his mind with a
love of it. For he that loves it not will not take much pains to get
it; nor be much concerned when he misses it. There is nobody in the
commonwealth of learning who does not profess himself a lover of
truth: and there is not a rational creature that would not take it
amiss to be thought otherwise of. And yet, for all this, one may truly
say, that there are very few lovers of truth, for truth's sake, even
amongst those who persuade themselves that they are so. How a man
may know whether he be so in earnest, is worth inquiry: and I think
there is one unerring mark of it, viz. The not entertaining any
proposition with greater assurance than the proofs it is built upon
will warrant. Whoever goes beyond this measure of assent, it is plain,
receives not the truth in the love of it; loves not truth for
truth's sake, but for some other bye-end. For the evidence that any
proposition is true (except such as are self-evident) lying only in
the proofs a man has of it, whatsoever degrees of assent he affords it
beyond the degrees of that evidence, it is plain that all the
surplusage of assurance is owing to some other affection, and not to
the love of truth: it being as impossible that the love of truth
should carry my assent above the evidence there is to me that it is
true, as that the love of truth should make me assent to any
proposition for the sake of that evidence which it has not, that it is
true: which is in effect to love it as a truth, because it is possible
or probable that it may not be true. In any truth that gets not
possession of our minds by the irresistible light of self-evidence, or
by the force of demonstration, the arguments that gain it assent are
the vouchers and gage of its probability to us; and we can receive
it for no other than such as they deliver it to our understandings.
Whatsoever credit or authority we give to any proposition more than it
receives from the principles and proofs it supports itself upon, is
owing to our inclinations that way, and is so far a derogation from
the love of truth as such: which, as it can receive no evidence from
our passions or interests, so it should receive no tincture from them.
  2. A forwardness to dictate another's beliefs, from whence. The
assuming an authority of dictating to others, and a forwardness to
prescribe to their opinions, is a constant concomitant of this bias
and corruption of our judgments. For how almost can it be otherwise,
but that he should be ready to impose on another's belief, who has
already imposed on his own? Who can reasonably expect arguments and
conviction from him in dealing with others, whose understanding is not
accustomed to them in his dealing with himself? Who does violence to
his own faculties, tyrannizes over his own mind, and usurps the
prerogative that belongs to truth alone, which is to command assent by
only its own authority, i.e. by and in proportion to that evidence
which it carries with it.
  3. Force of enthusiasm, in which reason is taken away. Upon this
occasion I shall take the liberty to consider a third ground of
assent, which with some men has the same authority, and is as
confidently relied on as either faith or reason; I mean enthusiasm:
which, laying by reason, would set up revelation without it. Whereby
in effect it takes away both reason and revelation, and substitutes in
the room of them the ungrounded fancies of a man's own brain, and
assumes them for a foundation both of opinion and conduct.
  4. Reason and revelation. Reason is natural revelation, whereby
the eternal Father of light and fountain of all knowledge,
communicates to mankind that portion of truth which he has laid within
the reach of their natural faculties: revelation is natural reason
enlarged by a new set of discoveries communicated by God
immediately; which reason vouches the truth of, by the testimony and
proofs it gives that they come from God. So that he that takes away
reason to make way for revelation, puts out the light of both, and
does much what the same as if he would persuade a man to put out his
eyes, the better to receive the remote light of an invisible star by a
telescope.
  5. Rise of enthusiasm. Immediate revelation being a much easier
way for men to establish their opinions and regulate their conduct
than the tedious and not always successful labour of strict reasoning,
it is no wonder that some have been very apt to pretend to revelation,
and to persuade themselves that they are under the peculiar guidance
of heaven in their actions and opinions, especially in those of them
which they cannot account for by the ordinary methods of knowledge and
principles of reason. Hence we see that, in all ages, men in whom
melancholy has mixed with devotion, or whose conceit of themselves has
raised them into an opinion of a greater familiarity with God, and a
nearer admittance to his favour than is afforded to others, have often
flattered themselves with a persuasion of an immediate intercourse
with the Deity, and frequent communications from the Divine Spirit.
God, I own, cannot be denied to be able to enlighten the understanding
by a ray darted into the mind immediately from the fountain of
light: this they understand he has promised to do, and who then has so
good a title to expect it as those who are his peculiar people, chosen
by him, and depending on him?
  6. Enthusiastic impulse. Their minds being thus prepared, whatever
groundless opinion comes to settle itself strongly upon their
fancies is an illumination from the Spirit of God, and presently of
divine authority: and whatsoever odd action they find in themselves
a strong inclination to do, that impulse is concluded to be a call
or direction from heaven, and must be obeyed: it is a commission
from above, and they cannot err in executing it.
  7. What is meant by enthusiasm. This I take to be properly
enthusiasm, which, though founded neither on reason nor divine
revelation, but rising from the conceits of a warmed or overweening
brain, works yet, where it once gets footing, more powerfully on the
persuasions and actions of men than either of those two, or both
together: men being most forwardly obedient to the impulses they
receive from themselves; and the whole man is sure to act more
vigorously where the whole man is carried by a natural motion. For
strong conceit, like a new principle, carries all easily with it, when
got above common sense, and freed from all restraint of reason and
check of reflection, it is heightened into a divine authority, in
concurrence with our own temper and inclination.
  8. Enthusiasm accepts its supposed illumination without search and
proof. Though the odd opinions and extravagant actions enthusiasm
has run men into were enough to warn them against this wrong
principle, so apt to misguide them both in their belief and conduct:
yet the love of something extraordinary, the ease and glory it is to
be inspired, and be above the common and natural ways of knowledge, so
flatters many men's laziness, ignorance, and vanity, that, when once
they are got into this way of immediate revelation, of illumination
without search, and of certainty without proof and without
examination, it is a hard matter to get them out of it. Reason is lost
upon them, they are above it: they see the light infused into their
understandings, and cannot be mistaken; it is clear and visible there,
like the light of bright sunshine; shows itself, and needs no other
proof but its own evidence: they feel the hand of God moving them
within, and the impulses of the Spirit, and cannot be mistaken in what
they feel. Thus they support themselves, and are sure reasoning hath
nothing to do with what they see and feel in themselves: what they
have a sensible experience of admits no doubt, needs no probation.
Would he not be ridiculous, who should require to have it proved to
him that the light shines, and that he sees it? It is its own proof,
and can have no other. When the Spirit brings light into our minds, it
dispels darkness. We see it as we do that of the sun at noon, and need
not the twilight of reason to show it us. This light from heaven is
strong, clear, and pure; carries its own demonstration with it: and we
may as naturally take a glow-worm to assist us to discover the sun, as
to examine the celestial ray by our dim candle, reason.
  9. Enthusiasm how to be discovered. This is the way of talking of
these men: they are sure, because they are sure: and their persuasions
are right, because they are strong in them. For, when what they say is
stripped of the metaphor of seeing and feeling, this is all it amounts
to: and yet these similes so impose on them, that they serve them
for certainty in themselves, and demonstration to others.
  10. The supposed internal light examined. But to examine a little
soberly this internal light, and this feeling on which they build so
much. These men have, they say, clear light, and they see; they have
awakened sense, and they feel: this cannot, they are sure, be disputed
them. For when a man says he sees or feels, nobody can deny him that
he does so. But here let me ask: This seeing, is it the perception
of the truth of the proposition, or of this, that it is a revelation
from God? This feeling, is it a perception of an inclination or
fancy to do something, or of the Spirit of God moving that
inclination? These are two very different perceptions, and must be
carefully distinguished, if we would not impose upon ourselves. I
may perceive the truth of a proposition, and yet not perceive that
it is an immediate revelation from God. I may perceive the truth of
a proposition in Euclid, without its being, or my perceiving it to be,
a revelation: nay, I may perceive I came not by this knowledge in a
natural way, and so may conclude it revealed, without perceiving
that it is a revelation of God. Because there be spirits which,
without being divinely commissioned, may excite those ideas in me, and
lay them in such order before my mind, that I may perceive their
connexion. So that the knowledge of any proposition coming into my
mind, I know not how, is not a perception that it is from God. Much
less is a strong persuasion that it is true, a perception that it is
from God, or so much as true. But however it be called light and
seeing, I suppose it is at most but belief and assurance: and the
proposition taken for a revelation is not such as they know to be
true, but take to be true. For where a proposition is known to be
true, revelation is needless: and it is hard to conceive how there can
be a revelation to any one of what he knows already. If therefore it
be a proposition which they are persuaded, but do not know, to be
true, whatever they may call it, it is not seeing, but believing.
For these are two ways whereby truth comes into the mind, wholly
distinct, so that one is not the other. What I see, I know to be so,
by the evidence of the thing itself: what I believe, I take to be so
upon the testimony of another. But this testimony I must know to be
given, or else what ground have I of believing? I must see that it
is God that reveals this to me, or else I see nothing. The question
then here is: How do I know that God is the revealer of this to me;
that this impression is made upon my mind by his Holy Spirit; and that
therefore I ought to obey it? If I know not this, how great soever the
assurance is that I am possessed with, it is groundless; whatever
light I pretend to, it is but enthusiasm. For, whether the proposition
supposed to be revealed be in itself evidently true, or visibly
probable, or, by the natural ways of knowledge, uncertain, the
proposition that must be well grounded and manifested to be true, is
this, That God is the revealer of it, and that what I take to be a
revelation is certainly put into my mind by Him, and is not an
illusion dropped in by some other spirit, or raised by my own fancy.
For, if I mistake not, these men receive it for true, because they
presume God revealed it. Does it not, then, stand them upon to examine
upon what grounds they presume it to be a revelation from God? or else
all their confidence is mere presumption: and this light they are so
dazzled with is nothing but an ignis fatuus, that leads them
constantly round in this circle; It is a revelation, because they
firmly believe it; and they believe it, because it is a revelation.
  11. Enthusiasm fails of evidence, that the proposition is from
God. In all that is of divine revelation, there is need of no other
proof but that it is an inspiration from God: for he can neither
deceive nor be deceived. But how shall it be known that any
proposition in our minds is a truth infused by God; a truth that is
revealed to us by him, which he declares to us, and therefore we ought
to believe? Here it is that enthusiasm fails of the evidence it
pretends to. For men thus possessed, boast of a light whereby they say
they are enlightened, and brought into the knowledge of this or that
truth. But if they know it to be a truth, they must know it to be
so, either by its own self-evidence to natural reason, or by the
rational proofs that make it out to be so. If they see and know it
to be a truth, either of these two ways, they in vain suppose it to be
a revelation. For they know it to be true the same way that any
other man naturally may know that it is so, without the help of
revelation. For thus, all the truths, of what kind soever, that men
uninspired are enlightened with, came into their minds, and are
established there. If they say they know it to be true, because it
is a revelation from God, the reason is good: but then it will be
demanded how they know it to be a revelation from God. If they say, by
the light it brings with it, which shines bright in their minds, and
they cannot resist: I beseech them to consider whether this be any
more than what we have taken notice of already, viz. that it is a
revelation, because they strongly believe it to be true. For all the
light they speak of is but a strong, though ungrounded persuasion of
their own minds, that it is a truth. For rational grounds from
proofs that it is a truth, they must acknowledge to have none; for
then it is not received as a revelation, but upon the ordinary grounds
that other truths are received: and if they believe it to be true
because it is a revelation, and have no other reason for its being a
revelation, but because they are fully persuaded, without any other
reason, that it is true, then they believe it to be a revelation
only because they strongly believe it to be a revelation; which is a
very unsafe ground to proceed on, either in our tenets or actions. And
what readier way can there be to run ourselves into the most
extravagant errors and miscarriages, than thus to set up fancy for our
supreme and sole guide, and to believe any proposition to be true, any
action to be right, only because we believe it to be so? The
strength of our persuasions is no evidence at all of their own
rectitude: crooked things may be as stiff and inflexible as
straight: and men may be as positive and peremptory in error as in
truth. How come else the untractable zealots in different and opposite
parties? For if the light, which every one thinks he has in his
mind, which in this case is nothing but the strength of his own
persuasion, be an evidence that it is from God, contrary opinions have
the same title to be inspirations; and God will be not only the Father
of lights, but of opposite and contradictory lights, leading men
contrary ways; and contradictory propositions will be divine truths,
if an ungrounded strength of assurance be an evidence that any
proposition is a Divine Revelation.
  12. Firmness of persuasion no Proof that any proposition is from
God. This cannot be otherwise, whilst firmness of persuasion is made
the cause of believing, and confidence of being in the right is made
an argument of truth. St. Paul himself believed he did well, and
that he had a call to it, when he persecuted the Christians, whom he
confidently thought in the wrong: but yet it was he, and not they, who
were mistaken. Good men are men still liable to mistakes, and are
sometimes warmly engaged in errors, which they take for divine truths,
shining in their minds with the clearest light.
  13. Light in the mind, what. Light, true light, in the mind is, or
can be, nothing else but the evidence of the truth of any proposition;
and if it be not a self-evident proposition, all the light it has,
or can have, is from the clearness and validity of those proofs upon
which it is received. To talk of any other light in the
understanding is to put ourselves in the dark, or in the power of
the Prince of Darkness, and, by our own consent, to give ourselves
up to delusion to believe a lie. For, if strength of persuasion be the
light which must guide us; I ask how shall any one distinguish between
the delusions of Satan, and the inspirations of the Holy Ghost? He can
transform himself into an angel of light. And they who are led by this
Son of the Morning are as fully satisfied of the illumination, i.e.
are as strongly persuaded that they are enlightened by the Spirit of
God as any one who is so: they acquiesce and rejoice in it, are
actuated by it: and nobody can be more sure, nor more in the right (if
their own belief may be judge) than they.
  14. Revelation must be judged of by reason. He, therefore, that will
not give himself up to all the extravagances of delusion and error
must bring this guide of his light within to the trial. God when he
makes the prophet does not unmake the man. He leaves all his faculties
in the natural state, to enable him to judge of his inspirations,
whether they be of divine original or no. When he illuminates the mind
with supernatural light, he does not extinguish that which is natural.
If he would have us assent to the truth of any proposition, he
either evidences that truth by the usual methods of natural reason, or
else makes it known to be a truth which he would have us assent to
by his authority, and convinces us that it is from him, by some
marks which reason cannot be mistaken in. Reason must be our last
judge and guide in everything. I do not mean that we must consult
reason, and examine whether a proposition revealed from God can be
made out by natural principles, and if it cannot, that then we may
reject it: but consult it we must, and by it examine whether it be a
revelation from God or no: and if reason finds it to be revealed
from God, reason then declares for it as much as for any other
truth, and makes it one of her dictates. Every conceit that thoroughly
warms our fancies must pass for an inspiration, if there be nothing
but the strength of our persuasions, whereby to judge of our
persuasions: if reason must not examine their truth by something
extrinsical to the persuasions themselves, inspirations and delusions,
truth and falsehood, will have the same measure, and will not be
possible to be distinguished.
  15. Belief no proof of revelation. If this internal light, or any
proposition which under that title we take for inspired, be
conformable to the principles of reason, or to the word of God,
which is attested revelation, reason warrants it, and we may safely
receive it for true, and be guided by it in our belief and actions: if
it receive no testimony nor evidence from either of these rules, we
cannot take it for a revelation, or so much as for true, till we
have some other mark that it is a revelation, besides our believing
that it is so. Thus we see the holy men of old, who had revelations
from God, had something else besides that internal light of
assurance in their own minds, to testify to them that it was from God.
They were not left to their own persuasions alone, that those
persuasions were from God, but had outward signs to convince them of
the Author of those revelations. And when they were to convince
others, they had a power given them to justify the truth of their
commission from heaven, and by visible signs to assert the divine
authority of a message they were sent with. Moses saw the bush burn
without being consumed, and heard a voice out of it: this was
something besides finding an impulse upon his mind to go to Pharaoh,
that he might bring his brethren out of Egypt: and yet he thought
not this enough to authorize him to go with that message, till God, by
another miracle of his rod turned into a serpent, had assured him of a
power to testify his mission, by the same miracle repeated before them
whom he was sent to. Gideon was sent by an angel to deliver Israel
from the Midianites, and yet he desired a sign to convince him that
this commission was from God. These, and several the like instances to
be found among the prophets of old, are enough to show that they
thought not an inward seeing or persuasion of their own minds, without
any other proof, a sufficient evidence that it was from God; though
the Scripture does not everywhere mention their demanding or having
such proofs.
  16. Criteria of a divine revelation. In what I have said I am far
from denying, that God can, or doth sometimes enlighten men's minds in
the apprehending of certain truths or excite them to good actions,
by the immediate influence and assistance of the Holy Spirit,
without any extraordinary signs accompanying it. But in such cases too
we have reason and Scripture; unerring rules to know whether it be
from God or no. Where the truth embraced is consonant to the
revelation in the written word of God, or the action conformable to
the dictates of right reason or holy writ, we may be assured that we
run no risk in entertaining it as such: because, though perhaps it
be not an immediate revelation from God, extraordinarily operating
on our minds, yet we are sure it is warranted by that revelation which
he has given us of truth. But it is not the strength of our private
persuasion within ourselves, that can warrant it to be a light or
motion from heaven: nothing can do that but the written Word of God
without us, or that standard of reason which is common to us with
all men. Where reason or Scripture is express for any opinion or
action, we may receive it as of divine authority: but it is not the
strength of our own persuasions which can by itself give it that
stamp. The bent of our own minds may favour it as much as we please:
that may show it to be a fondling of our own, but will by no means
prove it to be an offspring of heaven, and of divine original.