Problem of Evil

The argument has two versions, the logical one (the existence of evil is logically inconsistent with that of God; that is, if one obtains the other is impossible) and the evidential one (the existence of evil makes that of God not impossible but unlikely). Here we look at the evidential version.

· The argument deals with two aspects of divine evil: evil permitted by God and evil directly performed by God.

· God is assumed omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent as in Christianity.

· 'Evil' here refers not only to what may be called 'moral evil,' such as the effects of wars, crimes, vices etc., but also to what may be called 'natural evil,' such as the effects of natural calamities like earthquakes, disease, hurricanes, etc.

‘God permitting evil’ version

1. God exists and is omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent.
2. Evil exists
3. An omnibenevolent being would eliminate evil, if possible.
4. An omniscient being would know all about evil and how to eliminate it, if possible.
5. An omnipotent being can do anything which is possible.
6. Likely, it is possible to eliminate at least some of the existing evil.
7. Hence, (1) is likely false.

Note:

• Some theists argue that evil exists because of our bad deeds: God gave us free will by making us in his image, and we misused it by choosing to sin. But this won't easily work. Freedom of choice involves at most the capacity to do either X (the good deed) and not-X (the evil deed). But having the capacity do the evil deed doesn't entail that one does the evil deed. God could have made us all saints, with the capacity to sin but with the always successful tendency to struggle against it. Some theists have argued that god could not do that, but as usual we stop here.
• In addition, many animals have very unpleasant death, and what do they have to do with our sins? Worse, they cannot sin, according to most theological views. (Strangely, this is a problem most theists seem uninterested in).

· A theist could say that it’s true that we don’t know a fully satisfactory solution to the problem of evil. So what? Why should we expect to know it, given our limitations?

· Some theists attack (6): lower level evil (pain and suffering, say) is necessary for higher level good (the virtues of benevolence and compassion, say) or our religious growth, and the lack of higher level goodness is worse than the presence of first level evil.

Problems:

I. Quantity: how much evil do we need to feel compassion?

II. Is it morally justifiable to make you suffer so that I may feel compassion?

III. Higher level vices caused by lower level evil?

IV. How much evil do we need for religious growth? C.S. Lewis thought that we need to be slapped down, but was he right?

‘God as the direct source of evil’ version

Some versions of the problem of evil address evil directly caused by god or done under his direct command. The point here is that god produces moral evil. Here it is necessary to appeal to some specific revelation in which god is assumed perfectly moral in the sense in which we understand morality.

· The god of scripture often engages in grossly immoral behavior. For example, He

1. orders the wholesale slaughter of children and pregnant women (Hosea 13:16)

2. slaughters people for what appear to be ludicrous reasons: 20,000 Jews because some of them had sex with Baal-worshippers (Num. 25:1-9); 70,000 Jews because Saul, on God’s orders, has taken a census of his men (2 Sam. 24: 1, 10, 15)

3. orders repeated genocide, e.g., Caananites, Hittites, Hivites, Perizzites, Girgashites, Amorites, Jebusites (Josh. 1-12).

4. allows the beating of slaves to death as long as they survive for two days (Ex. 20:20-21)

5. orders the killing of children who strike their parents (Ex 21:15), witches (Ex 22:18), Sabbath breakers (Ex 31:14-15), idolaters, including friends and family (Deut. 13: 6-10, 12-16; 17:2-7), homosexuals (Lev. 20:13), rebellious or disobedient sons (Deut. 21:18-21), adulterers (Deut. 22:22). The Abrahamic god also orders miscellaneous stonings, including that of women who are not virgins when they marry (Deut. 22:13-21)

Since an omnibenevolent god would not behave this way, the god of scripture does not exist.

· The god of Abrahamic religions punishes people eternally, which is evil (unjust) because there’s no proportion between any sin and an infinitely long torment. Even if the torment were finite, fitting the crime, why didn’t god show himself before, thus making the sin less likely? So, god does not exist. (See Lewis’ article)

· God is hidden in the sense that he does not reveal himself to all of those who honestly seek him, or do not resist him out of wickedness, thus preventing them from having a loving relationship with him. Since such relationship is the highest good we can achieve, god does not love many of us. (Think about how a loving parent would behave). So, god does not exist. (See Schellenberg’s article)

There are objections to the above arguments, some involving biblical interpretation, but we stop here.

As with the argument from design, it’s important to distinguish between:

1. P providing evidence for Q

2. P being compatible with Q.

In (1) the truth of P makes that of Q certain or at least likely; in (2) P and Q can both be true even if the truth of P makes the falsity of Q likely. The fact that Mary took a bike ride (A) may provide good evidence that the weather was nice (B). However, Mary may have taken the bike ride even if the weather was not nice: A provides evidence for B but is also compatible with the negation of B. So, even if one finds the evidential argument from evil strong, one may have even stronger reasons for believing in the Abrahamic god, in which case one should try to show how (2) applies in the case, that is, come up with a story reconciling that god’s existence and the existence of evil.