From William Paley, The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy (1785).

CHAPTER VI: UTILITY.

So, then, actions are to be estimated by their tendency. (Actions in the abstract are right or wrong, according to their tendency; the agent is virtuous or vicious, according to his design. Thus, if the question be, Whether relieving common beggars be right or wrong, we inquire into the tendency of such a conduct to the the public advantage or inconvenience. If the question be, Whether a man remarkable for this sort of bounty is to be esteemed virtuous for that reason, we inquire into his design, whether his liberality sprang from charity or from ostentation. It is evident that our concern is with actions in the abstract) Whatever is expedient is right. It is the utility of any moral rule alone, which constitutes the obligation of it.
But to all this there seems a plain objection, viz. that many actions are useful, which no man in his senses will allow to be right. There are occasions in which the hand of the assassin would be very useful. The present possessor of some great estate employs his influence and fortune, to annoy, corrupt, or oppress all about him. His estate would devolve, by his death, to a successor of an opposite character. It is useful, therefore, to despatch such a one as soon as possible out of the way; as the neighborhood will exchange thereby a pernicious tyrant for a wise and generous benefactor.... Must we admit these actions to be right, which would be to justify assassination, plunder, and perjury; or must we give up our principle, that the criterion of right is
utility ? It is not necessary to do either.
The true answer is this; that these actions, after all, are not useful, and for that reason, and that alone, are not right. To see this point perfectly, it must be observed, that the bad consequences of actions are twofold, particular and general.
The particular bad consequences of an action is the mischief which that single action directly and immediately occasions.
The general bad consequence is the violation of some necessary or useful general rule.
Thus, the particular bad consequence of the assassination above described is the fright and pain which the deceased underwent; the loss he suffered of life, which is as valuable to a bad man as to a good one, or more so; the prejudice and affliction of which his death was the occasion, to his family, friends, and dependents.
The general bad consequence is the violation of this necessary general rule, that no man be put to death for his crimes but by public authority.
Although, therefore, such an action have no particular bad consequences, or greater particular good consequences, yet it is not useful, by reason of the general consequence, which is of more importance, and which is evil... But as this solution supposes that the moral government of the world must proceed by general rules, it
remains that we show the necessity of this.

CHAPTER VII: THE NECESSITY OF GENERAL RULES.

You cannot permit one action and forbid another without showing a difference between them. Consequently, the same sort of actions must be generally permitted or generally forbidden. Where, therefore, the general permission of them would be pernicious, it becomes necessary to lay down and support the rule which generally forbids them.
Thus, to return once more to the case of the assassin, the assassin knocked the rich villain on the head, because he thought him better out of the way than in it. If you allow this excuse in the present instance, you must allow it to all who act in the same manner and from the same motive; that is, you must allow every man to kill any one he meets whom he thinks noxious or useless; which, in the event, would be to commit every man's life and safety to the spleen, fury, and fanaticism of his neighbour;--a disposition of affairs which would soon fill the world with misery and confusion; and ere long put an end to human society, if not to the human species...
Before we prosecute the consideration of general consequences any further, it may be proper to anticipate a reflection, which will be apt enough to suggest itself in the progress of our argument.
As the general consequence of an action, upon which so much of the guilt of a bad action depends, consists in the example; it should seem that if the action be done with perfect secrecy, so as to furnish no bad example, that part of the guilt drops off. In the case of suicide, for instance, if a man can so manage matters, as to take away his own life without being known or suspected to have done so, he is not chargeable with any, mischief from the example; nor does his punishment seem necessary, in order to save the authority of any general rule.
In the first place, those who reason in this manner do not observe that they are setting up a general rule, of all others the least to be endured; namely, that secrecy, whenever secrecy is practicable, will justify any action.
Were such a rule admitted, for instance in the case above produced; is there not reason to fear that people would be disappearing perpetually?
In the next place, I would wish them to be well satisfied about the points proposed in the following queries:
1. Whether the Scriptures do not teach us to expect that, at the general Judgment of the world, the most secret actions will be brought to light?
2. For what purpose can this be, but to make them the objects of reward and punishment ?
3. Whether, being so brought to light, they will not fall under the operation of those equal and impartial rules, by which-God will deal with his creatures?
They will then become examples, whatever they be now; and require the same treatment from the judge and governor of the moral world, as if they had been detected from the first.

CHAPTER VIII: THE CONSIDERATION OF GENERAL CONSEQUENCES PURSUED.

THE general consequence of any action may be estimated, by asking what would be the consequence, if the same sort of actions were generally permitted. But suppose they were, and a thousand such actions perpetrated under this permission; is it just to charge a single action with the collected guilt and mischief of the whole thousand? I answer, that the reason for prohibiting and punishing an action (and this reason may be called the guilt of the action, if you please) will always be in proportion to the whole mischief that would arise from the general impunity and toleration of actions of the same sort.
“Whatever is expedient is right.” But then it must be expedient on the whole, at the long run, in all its effects collateral and remote, as well as in those which are immediate and direct; as it is obvious, that, in computing consequences, it makes no difference in what way or at what distance they ensue.
To impress this doctrine on the minds of young readers, and to teach them to extend their views beyond the immediate mischief of a crime, I shall here subjoin a string of instances, in which the particular consequences are comparatively insignificant; and where the malignity of the crime, and the severity with which human laws pursue it, is almost entirely founded upon the general consequence.
The particular consequence of coining is the loss of a guinea or of half a guinea to the person who receives the counterfeit money: the general consequence (by which I mean the consequence, that would ensue if the same practice were generally permitted) is to abolish the use of money....
The particular consequence of breaking into a house empty of inhabitants is the loss of a pair of siIver candlesticks or a few spoons: the general consequence is that nobody could leave their house empty....
And what proves incontestably the superior importance of general consequences is that crimes are the same, and treated in the same manner, though the particular consequence be very different. The crime and fate of the house-breaker is the same, whether his booty be five pounds or fifty. And the reason is that the general consequence is the same...