Non-consequentialist theories

Non-consequentialist theories claim that what we ought to do does not depend on the consequences of our actions.  There are different and conflicting types of non-consequentialist theories.  Here we look at Kant’s theory.

Kant’s Deontology

One way to approach Kant’s theory is to contrast it with Utilitarianism.  For the latter, the right depends on something else, the good: what's right is to maximize the good; the right is a means to bring about the good.
By contrast, for Kant the right does not depend on anything else: morality is, in this respect, autonomous.

For K., morality has three formal features:

1. It applies to persons, i.e. all beings endowed with a rational will, i.e., all beings capable of making decisions on the basis of rules of behavior. In K’s jargon, morality is universal

2. It applies to persons always and in all cases. In K’s jargon, morality is necessary. 

3. Moral obligation presupposes the power to carry it out: One is morally obliged to do X only if it is in one's power to do X. In other words, for K. “I ought to” implies “I can.”

(1)-(3) together lead to two important conclusions:

i. As a person is under moral obligation at all times and in all situations, a person must have the power to do what is right at all times and in all situations. But the only thing that is always in a person’s power is her will, her intentions. So, the morality of an action must depend on the intention of the agent and not on consequences or emotions, or feelings because none of these is wholly within the agent’s power.

NOTE: For K., this consideration suffices to rule out Consequentialism.

ii. Because of (1), the ground of the moral law cannot rest on any consideration of what's empirically true of man or any other specific person, but on a-priori (i.e., non-empirical) considerations about what it is to be a person, that is, to have a rational will.

Thought Question: Can Consequentialism address K’s charges by using the distinction between the morality of the action and that of the agent?

1) A good will, the decision to follow the moral law because it is right, is the only thing that is good without qualification, independently of its success. While other capacities, e.g., intelligence, gifts of fortune, talent, can operate against morality (think of a clever thief), a good will always acts in accordance with the principles of morality.
 NOTE:

•  To will is not to desire, but to decide on a course of action. For K., while I may not be able to control my desires, I can always control my decisions.
•  A decision is morally good only if taken for the sake of one's duty towards the moral law, because the agent thinks that the intended action is right.
•  Acting for the sake of duty is not merely acting in accordance with duty.  (The shopkeeper example). Note also that acting out of sympathy or love does not rise to the level of morality

K. is very insistent on the motive of duty because:

· Even praiseworthy emotions and feelings need not lead to the moral decision in all cases

· Morality requires acting with the goal of being right

Of course, often our actions stem from mixed motives involving duty and emotions/feelings.

2) The moral worth of a decision lies in the maxim (the principle or rule) according to which it has been made, that is, the maxim on the basis of which the will has operated.
So, the shopkeeper acted from the maxim “Don’t cheat your customers if you want good business” or, alternatively, from the maxim “Don’t steal.”

3) A specific maxim is moral if it stems from the Categorical Imperative, an abstract maxim any fully rational person would follow.

Kant gives different formulations of the Categorical Imperative which he claims are equivalent (whether they are is a matter of debate).   Two are especially important:

1.  Act only on the maxim through which you can at the same time will that it be a universal law (Universal law formula)
2.  Treat humanity in your own person or in the person of any other never simply as   a means but always at the same time as an end. (End in itself formula)

 NOTE: Although strictly speaking there is only one Categorical Imperative, one can call any maxim which satisfies (1) and/or (2) a categorical   imperative. For example, we shall see that ‘Don’t steal’ satisfies (1)-(2) and therefore we may call it a, but not the, categorical imperative

4)  A categorical imperative must be distinguished from a hypothetical imperative:

· A categorical imperative is a command whose justification does not presuppose any further end but consists in the fact that it satisfies both the universal and the end in itself formulas.

· A hypothetical imperative is a command whose justification depends on what one wants.  For example, ‘If you want good business, don't cheat your customers’ is a hypothetical imperative because the justification for the command ‘Don't cheat your customers’ depends on the desirability of having good business. 
NOTE: Hence, a hypothetical imperative carries no implication that one ought to do what it commands (I might give up the idea of having good business).  By contrast, a categorical imperative implies that one ought to do what it states because, K believes, its justification rests on something that any rational person would approve of.

5)  The universal law version of CI says ‘Act only on the maxim through which you can at the same time will that it be a universal law.’

Rationale: it determines maxims which could be adopted by persons without assuming anything specific about their desires, capacities or social relations, which are merely contingent, dependent on fortune; in other words it determines maxims that would be adopted by a rational person as such. Keep in mind that the moral law applies to all, and therefore cannot depend on whether you are rich, poor, intelligent, powerful, etc.

6) Application of the Universal Law formula

CI provides us with a test to determine what to will, that is, whether an action is moral, immoral or merely permissible.  However, how this is supposed to work is far from clear, and Kant’s own examples don't help too much. A possible reconstruction is as follows.

A. Test for perfect duties.

1. Give an adequate formulation of the universal maxim M embodied in your action.  So, suppose you’re thinking about lying to get a better grade. Then M = “every time it's to one's advantage to do so, one lies.”
2. Let N be M's contrary. In our example, N = “At no time when it's to one's advantage to do so does one lies.”
3. Suppose everyone followed M; then suppose that everyone followed N.
4. If only one of M and N is pragmatically self-defeating, then that one is an immoral maxim and its contrary is obligatory. Look at the example: M would be pragmatically self defeating if everybody followed it (who would believe one?).  Hence, M is immoral and N is morally obligatory, in fact, a perfect duty, a duty of justice, namely one that

· has a corresponding right. So, you have right not to be lied to

· can be always satisfied: it’s possible for me not to lie to anyone.

Problem: Consider now M = "always borrow money, but never lend it", and N = "never borrow money, but always lend it." Both M and N would be pragmatically self-defeating if everybody followed them (borrowers need lenders and vice versa). And yet one is hard pressed in understanding why either would be morally wrong.

B. Test for imperfect duties.
Same as above with one difference: at (4) substitute "incompatible with some basic features of rational will" for "pragmatically self-defeating."
Example 1:

• M = neither help people in need, nor seek help when in need.
• N = help people in need and seek help when in need.

M is incompatible with the successful pursuit of desirable goals, an outcome no rational being would want.  So, N is an imperfect duty.

Example 2:

• M= always seek pleasure neglecting your talents and skills
• N= never seek pleasure neglecting your talents and skills

M fails the test because a rational being sets ends for himself the satisfaction of which requires talent and skill, intellectual and otherwise.
NOTE: an imperfect duty is one which cannot be satisfied by all agents in all actions towards all persons (e.g., we cannot help everybody). Imperfect duties are duties of beneficence and

· have no corresponding rights. So, I have a duty to help you but you have no right to my help

· typically can be satisfied only selectively: I can’t help everybody.

7) The "end in itself" formulation of CI says:  “Treat humanity in your own person or in the person of any other never simply as a means but always at the same time as an end.”
Rationale:
 Since humans are persons (beings endowed with a rational will), they have intrinsic objective value and hence they are ends in themselves.  Since the value of everything else is parasitic on that of persons and a means is less valuable than its end, treating persons merely as means amounts to denying that they are ends in  themselves, that is, persons.
The meaning of the maxim is made clearer by the following:

• Treating X simply as a means consists involving X in a course of action to which X could not consent because the prerequisites of consent are missing. This is wrong because it fails to recognize that having a rational will entails establishing a link between one’s values and one’s actions –hence the importance of consent.
    Examples: If I deceive you or coerce you cannot consent because consent rules out deception or coercion. Presumably, the duty of no-harm falls under this category
    NOTE: not treating a person merely as a means is a perfect duty, a duty of justice

Thought Question: how does one deal with cases of false consciousness?

•  Treating X as an end involves supporting X’s capacities to achieve her ends, as long as they don't involve treating someone merely as a means.
  NOTE: Treating a person as an end is an imperfect duty.

Rationale of the end-in–itself rule: A rational will manifests itself in the link between one's values and what one does. Treating people as means weakens the link; treating them as ends enhances it.

Thought Question. Suppose that Jane is convicted of stealing and the judge proceeds to sentence her. Now Jane protests that she doesn't want to be sentenced saying: "If you sentence me you will simply be using me for your (and society's) ends."  Is she right from a Kantian perspective?

8) In following CI, a rational being is autonomous, since one follows the rational code of behavior which one, insofar as rational, has oneself created. This is analogous to following rational laws in one's reasoning.

9) Virtue is a firm disposition to fulfill one's duty (i.e. to follow CI out of duty).  A mark of virtue is a feeling of joy in performing one's duty.  Note that such feeling is not involved in the motive of a moral action.

10) Kant’s view culminates in what he calls “the kingdom of ends.”  Consider a “systematic union” of all rational beings acting on the basis of good will, i.e., on the basis of universal and morally necessary laws.  Then, since laws determine ends  with regard to their “universal validity, we shall be able--if we abstract from the  personal differences between rational beings, and also from the content of their  private ends-- to conceive...a kingdom of ends which is possible in accordance with  the above principles [i.e., CI].”
 John Rawls has proposed that we take Kant to ask which maxims we would want to be universal law not from the standpoint of our individual situation (talents, race, sex, wealth, etc., including conceptions of non-moral good), but from that of a  rational person who doesn't know his own individual situation (this is another way  of saying that in justifying universal maxims, we cannot appeal to our, or anybody's,  individual situation).  Form behind this “veil of ignorance,” we all would choose  those maxims which guarantee that our dignity as persons be satisfied and we be  able to pursue our individual conceptions of non-moral good, whatever they might  be, thus combining the two versions of CI we have considered.

11) Problems

Two features that some find appealing are that K’s ethics forbids certain action absolutely and often can provide certainty that one has done the right thing (Compare this with Consequentialism). However, this comes at a cost:

1.  Rigorism.
 Kant’s ethics is case-insensitive.  For example, Kant claims that one should never lie.  But what should one do when someone's life is at stake?    Should the Danish fisherman smuggling Jews to Sweden tell the truth to the Nazi officer on the patrol boat?   Most of us would say “no”, but Kant says “yes”.   (Notice that being silent won't do here).  Kant might argue that telling the truth is a perfect duty (the Nazi has a right not to be lied to) while helping others is an imperfect duty (the Jew hasn't a right to be helped).  But many would find this answer appalling.  Of course one should lie to the Nazi.
Replies:

· Perhaps Kant overstated the requirements of CI.  “Lie when and only when it is necessary to save the life of an innocent person” seems to pass the universal law test because its range is small enough not to destroy the institution of promise keeping, without which the maxim would become self-defeating.
 Even so, it's hard to see how the maxim would satisfy the end in itself version of CI.
 NOTE: this raises the further problem of the equivalence of the various versions of CI.

· Perhaps one could do some fancy footwork with the notion of lying. For example, one might say that telling a lie involves not only intentionally telling a falsehood but doing so to a person who has the right to be told the truth. Since one may argue that the Nazi has no right to know the truth. The fisherman is not lying to him. 

2. Insensitivity to the good

Kant’s ethics may require of us that we make the world less of a good or happy place: if it’s my duty to do X and doing so will result in the production of much unhappiness, I still have to do X. Kant’s answer is that it’s not the role of morality to produce happiness.

3. Difficulty in addressing conflicts between two perfect duties or two imperfect duties. For example, I have a perfect duty to tell the truth and also a perfect duty not to harm you. But what if telling the truth will harm you?

4. For K. only intentional actions have any moral standing. But many actions may be the result of organizations or movements without any clear decisional structure, and yet we would want to say that such actions are moral or immoral. (Note that Util. does not have this problem at all).