Animals

There are two main moral issues concerning our dealings with animals (here by "animals" I mean non-human animals):

1. Do animals belong in the moral sphere intrinsically or merely parasitically?
2. If they belong to the sphere of morality intrinsically, how should we deal with them?

A.    Do animals belong in the moral sphere intrinsically?

Of course (some) animals belong within the moral sphere parasitically: they are someone's pets or property, and harming them is indirectly harming their owner.  However, here we are addressing a different issue: Do animals per se belong in the moral sphere?  Those who adopt a negative answer, e.g. Aquinas or Kant, embrace radical speciesism: Since animals don't fall within the purview of morality, we can do with them as we please; consequently, even trivial human interests take precedence over vital animal interests.

Arguments for Radical Speciesism:

Theological arguments:

• We are made in God's image; animals aren't
  Problem: Difficult to see why this is relevant. Moreover, animals feel pain, and causing unnecessary pain seems evil.
• We have immortal souls; animals don't.

Problem: it's hard to see the relevance of having or lacking an immortal soul to being a subject of morality or not. If anything, the lack of an immortal soul should make us more sympathetic to animals.

• At Genesis 1:26 God gives humans dominion over the animals: they exist for us to do what we want with them.
  Problem: From the fact that we have dominion over animals it does not even begin to follow that we are allowed to do whatever we want with them. A ruler can be good or evil.

There is, of course, the broader problem of the ‘historical’ truth of Genesis.

Sentience arguments:

• Animals are mere machines, without any sensations or feeling.  Hence, picking an animal apart is like breaking a watch, which per se is certainly not morally wrong.  By contrast, humans are conscious.
  Problem: The idea that animals are mere machines seems false for three main reasons:
1. Animal behavior is exactly what we would expect if animals had sensations and emotions
2. The neural structures which are involved in sensation and emotion in us have analogous counterparts in some non-human animals (at least in mammals and birds). For example, scientists have studied what happens in the brain of poultry when debeaking occurs. First, there is a firing of A-fibers and then of B-fibers, just as when a human puts her hand on a very hot surface. In humans, A-fiber stimulation is not associated with pain but is produces a quick removal of the hand; B-fiber stimulation occurs after the hand has been removed and is associated with pain. Evolutionary considerations suggest that the same is true for birds. When it comes to primates, the possibility that they don’t feel pain is unbelievably remote.
3. All contemporary primatologists use anthropomorphic considerations to understand the behavior of apes. Some even find the emotional building blocks of morality in ape behavior.
• Animals have no sense of self through time; they can at most experience disconnected fragments of pain.  But these fragments of pain don't amount to suffering, which involves the ability to think of oneself as being in pain through time. But suffering, and not mere pain, is morally relevant.
  Problems:
1. There is a lot of evidence that some animals have a diachronic sense of self.  Moreover, many animals do seem to become stressed when in unpleasant situations for a long time.
2. Why shouldn't pain fragments count? Pain is bad, fragmented or not.

Personhood argument:

Humans are persons, animals aren't.  But only persons are within the sphere of morality.  Hence, animals are outside such sphere.
It’s unclear what the necessary and sufficient conditions for personhood are. There are two main views:

• Strong version: An individual is a person if and only if it is
1. self-conscious, i.e. able to think of itself as itself through time.
2. capable to act on the basis of moral beliefs

Problems:

· There’s good evidence that some animals satisfy (1).

· Even assuming that no animals satisfies (2), there are humans that fail to satisfy (2) as well. This would entail that some human beings are not persons.

• Weak version: An individual is a person if and only if it is
1. conscious , e.g. aware of one's surroundings.
2. self- conscious, i.e. able to think of oneself as oneself through time.
3. able to reason and know, e.g. plan, understand.
4. a sentient being, e.g. feeling pain/pleasure.
5. able to have emotions.

Problem: Many, perhaps all, non-human mammals satisfy (1)-(5). One could object than animals cannot reason, but that is ridiculously false. Crows (!) can solve complex problems involving abstraction; chimps have a political system involving alliances, medicate themselves, and have cultures.

Hence, it looks as if the strong version of personhood leaves out too many humans, and the weak version lets in some animals. 

A further problem is that it’s difficult to argue that only persons belong in the moral sphere.

Thought Question: Can you think of some arguments?

Arguments against Radical Speciesism:

• Utilitarian argument: If animals are sentient, PU demands that their pains and pleasures be taken into account.
• Some animals are emotionally and intellectually similar to us, and therefore no harm should be inflicted on them unless necessary.

NOTE: This can go very far. For example, since 1999 in New Zealand apes cannot be used in testing, research, and teaching except in their own interest.

• Moral Individualism argument (James Rachels): Morality demands that individual beings be treated in the same way unless there is a relevant difference between them which justifies the difference in treatment.  Hence, if the treatment involves pain, the fact that human A, but not the animal B, is a person, is an irrelevant difference.  What matters is that both A and B can feel pain.
  
  

Some of those who find Radical Speciesism unacceptable and ill argued favor

Mild Speciesism

Animals cannot be moral agents (they're unable to engage in moral reasoning), and consequently, although they do belong in the moral sphere, the morally relevant differences between them and humans are wide enough to justify very unequal moral treatment.
Problem: Some of the criticisms that affect Radical Speciesism (e.g., comatose humans, infants) affect Mild Speciesism as well.

For Mild Speciesism, when trivial human interest and substantial animal interest are in conflict, we should choose the latter.  However, when they are comparable (e.g. equal or not largely different), we should give preference to human interests. For example, we should conduct animal experiments to find cures for human diseases but nor to produce a new shampoo.

Thought Question: Do you find Mild Speciesism attractive? Why? Why not?

B.  If animals intrinsically belong in the moral sphere, how should we deal with them?
This question can be broken down into three others:

I. is it prima facie wrong to kill animals, however painlessly (imagine zapping them out of existence, as it were)?

II. is industrial animal farming wrong?

III. Is animal experimentation wrong?

I.    Is it prima facie permissible to kill animals painlessly?

• Clearly, to the extent that an animal is a person, it has a very substantive claim (a right) to life, and consequently it's deeply wrong to kill it.  As we saw, depending on which criteria for personhood once accepts, there is a good ground for claiming that at least some animals are persons.
• A more controversial issue is whether mere sentience is enough to give some claim to life. Some Utilitarians say ‘yes’ because a conscious being can derive pleasure from satisfaction of desire, and eliminating pleasure is bad.

Thought Question: Do you think that only persons have a claim to life?

II.    Industrial animal farming

Before considering industrial animal farming and animal experimentation, it may be helpful to make a few points about the Animal Welfare Act, the federal law protecting animals.  The original AWA was enacted in 1966, and revised six times after that

• the law applies to animals; However, for the US, "animal" doesn't mean what it seems to mean to the average English speaker.  In its original form (1966) the animals covered were "live dogs, cats, monkeys (non-human primate animals), guinea pigs, hamsters and rabbits."  Later (1970)  the term was expanded to cover "any live or dead dog, cat, monkey (non human primate mammal), guinea pig, hamster, rabbit, or such other warm-blooded animal, as the Secretary may determine is being used, or is intended for use, for research, testing, experimentation, or exhibition purposes or as a pet; but such term excludes horses not used for research purposes and other farm animals, such as, but not limited to livestock or poultry, used or intended for use as food or fiber, or livestock or poultry used or intended for improving animal nutrition, breeding, management or production efficiency, or for improving the quality of food or fiber. With respect to a dog the term means all dogs including those used for hunting, security, or breeding purposes."  The USDA, the agency charged with providing the regulations for the AWA, interprets the  term "animal" to exclude "birds, rats of the genus Rattus and mice of the genus Mus bred for use in research."
  NOTE: the following animals are excluded: birds, Rattus, Mus (i.e. mice and rats commonly used in labs), all cold-blooded animals; farm animals, unless they are used in experiments; equines used in entertainment events (e.g., rodeos, mule-diving, etc.), reptiles, birds, and amphibians.  However, birds suddenly become animals when animal-fighting ventures are concerned (if the relevant state law prohibits cock-fighting).
• The law applies to zoos, aquariums, research facilities, puppy mills, animal dealers, and circuses. Regulations have been questioned: for example, a dolphin can be kept in a tank 24 feet long and 6 feet deep.
• The law doesn't apply to: farm animals, retail pet stores, state and county fairs, livestock shows, rodeos, purebred dog and cat shows.
• There's minimal regulation of experiments
• Since 1985, the psychological welfare of animals in the lab is considered; for example an animal cannot be subjected to a major operative experiment more than once
• Mostly, AWA regulates how animals are transported, housed, and treated before and after an experiment.

A. Some facts about industrial animal farming:

• The numbers of animals involved just in the US is very large: over 7 billion chickens, 300 million turkeys, 80 million pigs, 1.2 million calves (veal), are slaughtered every year.  There are about 250 million egg producing hens; about 10 million milking cows. About 2.4 billion fish are raised and killed in acquafarms.
• Most industrial animal farming in much of the world (with few exceptions) involves treating animals as things.  In the US, common practices involve cramped housing (e.g. 5-6 egg laying chickens are put in a cage with a floor of 18X18 inches), separation of mother and young, breaking up of herds, branding, transporting, and slaughtering.  Aggression and cannibalism brought about by crowding and stress are curtailed by debeaking (poultry), tail docking and front teeth snipping (pigs), light manipulation, and chemicals.  Calves for veal meat are fed an anemic diet and kept in small stalls, about 22X54 inches, so that they are unable to move about.  Animals are treated with large amounts of antibiotics, without which animal factories would probably be impossible; as a result, because of handling some of the flesh Americans eat is contaminated with bacteria which are resistant to many antibiotics.
• The conversion rates of feed protein to animal protein are low: 22% for cow milk, 23% for hen eggs, 17% for broilers, 12% for pigs, 4% for beef.  This inefficiency requires the cultivation of vast tracts of land: most agricultural products produced in the US are for animal feed.
• Industrial animal farming produces large amounts of waste. For example, in addition to animal carcasses, an average 50,000 pig farm produces about 3,000 tons of manure and urine per week; a 60,000 laying egg chicken farm produces about 82 tons of manure per week.  Some of the waste is recycled as feed, some of it degraded in waste holding facilities.  Occasionally, spillage contaminates rivers, lakes, sea-coasts, and the water table.

B.  Considerations about industrial animal farming

• The amount of animal pain involved in treating sentient beings as things greatly outweighs the pleasures coming from the tickling of our palate.

Problem: one might argue that given the gulf between humans and animals, animal pain/pleasure is incomparable to human pain/pleasure.
Notice that one ought to specify 1) what the "gulf" consists in, and 2) why it is relevant to the evaluation of pain/pleasure.

• Industrial animal farming requires cultivating land which could be returned to a natural state, and often substantial pollution of land and water due to spillage. 
• Industrial animal farming has kept the prices of food low, and this is good for us.

Problem: Maybe not; it’s unclear that much of the food people eat is good for them. At any rate, vegetarianism is medically viable and probably healthier than the average American diet.

• Overcrowding, ill treatment, and the excessive use of antibiotics they require, appear at least partially responsible for some bad consequences: a portion of broilers, eggs and beef are contaminated with Salmonella, Listeria, Campylobacter, or E. coli. Worse, some of the contaminating bacteria are now resistant antibiotics.  Hence, it may be reasonable to eliminate or drastically reform industrial animal farming.  However, irradiation some other technological solution may be found to eliminate the problem.
• since many animals hurt/eat each other, we may do the same to them, and therefore industrial animal farming is justified. 

Problem: It’s a non-sequitur. Animals are amoral, and consequently their behavior cannot be a guide for what we do.

• it's natural prey on animals, and therefore industrial animal farming is justified.

Problem: It’s a non-sequitur. Even assuming that it’s natural for us to prey on animals, it doesn’t follow that we may be cruel to them.

• The rejection of industrial animal farming or of painful practices is largely compatible with the eating of flesh. Some animals farm use humane practices. See Singer’s video.

III.    Animals in the laboratory

A. Some facts about the use of animals in US laboratories:
In the US, between 18 and 23 million animals are used in laboratory research every year. The AWA offers little protection. Some examples may suffice. These two infamous experiments were carried out after the AWA was passed (1966), and  involved Rhesus monkeys, primates explicitly covered by the law.

1. The US armed Forces Radiobiology Institute trained rhesus monkeys to run inside a wheel by giving them an electric shock if they slowed down.  Then, they were given a lethal dose of radiation.  While sick, vomiting, and defecating (these are effects of radiation) they were compelled to run until they dropped.  The alleged reason for the experiment was to see for how long irradiated soldiers could keep on fighting (Carol Frantz, "Effects of Mixed Neutron-Gamma Total-body Irradiation on Physical Activity performance of Rhesus Monkeys", Radiation Research  vol. 10 (1985), pp. 434-41)
   NOTE: because of military secrecy, it's almost impossible for the public to know what the US military does to animals.

2. At the Primate Research Center in Madison, Wisconsin, rhesus monkeys were raised under conditions of maternal deprivation, so that when placed among normal monkeys, they would sit in a corner in a state of depression and fear.  Harlow and Suomi put female rhesus in a small steel cages a few hours after their birth and left them there in total isolation for 18 months.  Then, the monkeys were impregnated with what they called a "rape rack," and after giving birth, let loose on their own offspring.  Some paid no attention to their offspring; others crushed their skulls or "smashed the infant's face on the floor, then rub[bed] it back and forth."  The rationale for the experiment was to study the psychopathology of maternal rejection in humans.  Harlow and Suomi explained how baby rhesus are similar to, but smarter than, baby humans; how maternal love is equally important in both; how normal rhesus mothers show affection to their offspring, etc. (Harlow and Soumi, "Induced Psychopathology in Monkeys", Engineering and Science, vol. 33 (1970), pp. 9-14)
   
   

B. Analysis:
Here are some relevant considerations:

• Utilitarian argument: Animal experimentation is justified as long as the amount of pain (human or animal) generated is smaller than the pleasure (human or animal) produced.
  For example, in order to test the toxicity of new household products, pesticides, cosmetics, drugs, weed killers, and industrial products, animals are subjected to a procedure called "LD50", designed to find the dose at which 50% of the subjects dies.  In the process that can last for 2 weeks, nearly all the animals become very sick.  Another test, the Draize test, consists in dripping concentrated solutions of shampoos, or cosmetics in the eyes of rabbits or dogs, which have to be restrained and prevented from rubbing their eyes.  If the damage falls within certain limits, the product is approved for human use. Although the FDA does not condemn the test, its popularity is diminishing. The good produced by LD50 or Draize is often minimal: we don't really need new shampoos, cosmetics, or preservatives.
  Medical experiment cases are more complex, depending on the view one takes of the end for which the experiments were performed and of the necessity of these experiments to achieve that end.  In general, Utilitarianism holds that if we are convinced that using Rhesus in labs is likely to be necessary to find a cure for some serious and widespread illness, then we should use them.
• Radical Speciesism: Given the immense moral gulf between humans (persons) and animals, even trivial human interests justify inflicting any amount of pain on animals.
• Mild Speciesism:  When trivial human interest and substantial animal interest are in conflict, we should choose the latter.  However, when they are comparable (e.g. equal or not largely different), we should give preference to human interests.

NOTE: Mild speciesism is much less egalitarian then Utilitarianism: in cases of equal, or even comparable, amount of animal and human pain, we should choose the former. Still inflicting pain to produce a new shampoo or detergent would not be permissible.

• Treatment of persons:  Persons should not be tortured either intentionally or as an unintended but foreseen consequence of one's activity.