Death

The philosophical issue whether death harms us and if so to what extent and when goes back to Greek philosophy. It is extremely complex and what follows just scratches the surface.

1. The issue here is not dying, but death. Nobody doubts that dying, vs. being dead, may harm us by being unpleasant.  Death may be an event, or a process, or even a state, and the arguments proposed vary depending on what notion of death one has.

Probably, the easiest approach is to think of death as a permanent state, that of being dead, involving the annihilation of the subject.

2. Is the fear of death justified? That is, is death an evil for the one who dies? If death is an evil for the one who dies, there are three (connected) issues:

1. What sort of evil is it?
2. When is it an evil?
3. Is it a great evil?

Epicurus argued that death should not be feared because “it is nothing to us”. Here’s a possible rendition of the argument.

One should distinguish two senses of evil for an individual:

1. X is evil per se (presumably, direct suffering, e.g. pain, fits the description)
2. X is evil in comparison to Z. That is, Z is better than X, although need not be an evil per se.

NOTES:

· Presumably, both X and Z must be attainable, so as to avoid bizarre comparisons.

· Being an evil by comparison doesn't entail being an evil per se (e.g. the worst among good options); being an evil per se doesn't entail being an evil by comparison (e.g., the best among bad options).

Argument:

1. X can be an evil per se for Y only if Y can be affected by X
2. No X can affect Y before X occurs or exists
3. Y cannot be affected by X after Y ceases to be
4. Y's being dead occurs after Y ceases to be
5. hence, Y's being dead cannot be an evil per se for Y either before Y’s death or after.
6. only evil per se may reasonably feared
7. hence, the fear of death is unjustified, like the fear of the dark.
8. hence, one should not cling to life merely in order to avoid death.
9. hence, length of life is subordinate to quality of life: the best life is that with the overall greatest pleasure (the large/pleasant food portion example)

NOTES:

· From the fact that death is not en evil per se it does not follow that it's a matter of indifference, as one can consistently hold that a happy life is better than no life: death is not an evil per se, but may be an evil by comparison.

· One may make the case that only evil per se may be a great evil and conclude that death is not a great evil for the one who dies.

Criticism of the argument

· A problematic premise is (2). One might claim that future events may affect me (but obviously not causally) now even if they have not occurred yet. If I value my reputation now, and in the future my reputation will be destroyed by slander, then I am harmed now. Similarly, if dying prevents me from finishing my project, and I value my project now, I am now harmed by the fact that my project will never be completed because my present goal will be thwarted.

· Another problematic premise is (3) in that it associates death with being dead, but that may be wrong. Otherwise, one might argue that we and death never exist at the same time. But this seems wrong: after all, I die. So, perhaps death can affect us when it occurs; in other words, death can be taken to be an event, not a state. So, death is an evil because its occurrence ensures that some goods will be unavailable to me. Of course, it is not easy to decide when death occurs: if at the first moment when certain functions cease, then one may argue that then the subject does not exists anymore; if at the last moment when certain functions are still active, then the subject is not yet dead.

· Another questionable premise is (6). I may fear death because it harms me by depriving me of goods I may reasonably expect to enjoy. (The “reasonably” clause is to avoid the objection that I am not harmed by the fact that I did not win the lottery, say). For example, if because of hard work I won a prize and death prevents me from enjoying it, it seems reasonable for me to consider death an evil, and perhaps a great evil. (Notice, however, that death may also free me from great harm, in which case it may be a good). One might answer that X is bad for one only if one can experience it, and dead people cannot experience anything because they don’t exist, but this seems implausible. If I always get mocked behind my back and I never know it, you may reasonably pity me not only because I’m mocked but also because I don’t know it. In short, there are evils per se that are not experienced by the subject.

B. Lucretius symmetry argument about pre-natal and post-mortal non-existence: we don't fear the former; so, we shouldn't we fear the latter.
Problems:

· We fear death because it's in the future; we have asymmetric attitudes towards past and future. Typically, we don’t want to extend our lives by being born earlier; we want to continue our lives by postponing death.

However, note that:

o We have symmetric attitudes towards past and future as they relate to others: I feel as bad whether I know today that my friend has died after long suffering or whether I know today he'll die after long suffering. So, is our asymmetric attitude justified when it comes to ourselves?

o We might wish we had been born earlier if we foresee that our lives are too short.

· It’s not death per se that is bad, but the fact that it brings a good thing, life, to an end. By contrast, my early non-existence did not bring any good thing to an end.

However, note that something may be bad because it postpones something which is good; so, my early non-existence postponed a good, namely, my existence.

C.

Perhaps non-premature death is not an evil by comparison immortality: if we, as we are now, were immortal, after we have tried everything crushing boredom would set in. That might be true, but it seems irrelevant to the human condition. Long lived humans die at 120 years or so, and extending their lives tenfold would not have to result in boredom. So perhaps the problem is not death per se, but the fact that we die too soon.

Of course, an extremely long life might become unbearable if accompanied by a serious decline, but that has to do with our lives, not our deaths.